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Abstract 
Studies of institutional monitoring focus on the fraction of the firm held by institutions. We focus 
on the fraction of the institution’s portfolio represented by the firm. In the context of 
acquisitions, we hypothesize that institutional monitoring will be greatest when the target firm 
represents a significant allocation of funds in the institution’s portfolio. We show that this 
measure is important in reconciling mixed findings for total institutional ownership in the prior 
literature.  The results indicate that our measure of institutional holdings leads to greater bid 
completion rates, higher premiums and lower acquirer returns. This empirical evidence provides 
support for theories predicting a beneficial effect of blockholders in monitoring the firm in 
general and in enhancing the gains to takeover targets in particular. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of large shareholders has been long recognized in the finance literature. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) propose large shareholders as a solution to the free-rider problem of 
Grossman and Hart (1980). Yet, despite Shleifer and Vishny’s explicit prediction that large 
shareholders can facilitate acquisitions even if they do not initiate them, unambiguous empirical 
evidence of such a role is absent from the literature, even when focusing on institutional 
blockholdings.1  Most studies now treat institutional ownership in a realized or potential target as 
a control variable which is routinely associated with target premiums that are either positive 
(Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang, 2012, and Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005), insignificant 
(Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter, 2008 and Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson, 2003), 
or negative (Huang, 2011, and Stulz, Walkling and Song, 1990).2 
However, when institutions have multiple holdings across firms, they accrue differing 
benefits to monitoring effort across firms as well. Just like independent directors value their 
directorships differently and exert more effort on the ones they perceive to be more prestigious 
(Masulis and Mobbs, 2014), institutions could have incentives to monitor portfolio positions 
more than others. While an institution may hold a block in a given firm, that firm may represent 
a small part of the institution’s total portfolio. A shareholder, institutional or otherwise, will 
focus its efforts on its largest holdings. When institutions have differing portfolio weights on an 
                                                     
1 Recent studies examine the role of specific institutions in special situations. For example, Officer, Ozbas and 
Sensoy (2010) document that institutional ownership and premiums are positively correlated in the particular 
context of club deals (situations in which two or more private equity firms jointly sponsor a leveraged buyout). 
Likewise, Greenwood and Schor (2009) study a subset of institutions (hedge funds) that endogenously invest in 
firms to force them into a takeover. They find that such investments exhibit good performance if the firms are 
eventually acquired. 
2 The mixed results in the literature related to the effect of institutional ownership on takeover premiums obtain 
under different empirical specifications and alternative ways to proxy for institutional ownership and premiums. 
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individual firm, total institutional ownership is a noisy measure of the underlying variable of 
interest: the fraction of the equity held by institutions for which this is a significant holding. 
In this paper, we argue that institutions allocate their monitoring effort to a firm based on 
the relative importance of the firm’s stock in their portfolio. We define monitoring institutions as 
those whose holding value in the firm is in the top 10% of their portfolio. Using three measures 
based on the size of holdings by monitoring institutions in a given firm, we examine the role of 
institutional investors in the acquisition process. The acquisition process is an ideal laboratory to 
study the impact of such institutions because of their theoretically predicted role and the 
substantial external effects that their monitoring can generate in that setting. 
Our results indicate that traditional institutional ownership proxies (measured relative to 
the target firm’s outstanding shares) such as the number of (or the ownership by) blockholders 
are not related to the probability of deal completion, to the likelihood of bid revision, or to the 
premium offered for the target firm.  
In contrast, we find that the probability of deal completion is increasing in the holdings of 
monitoring institutions in the target firm. A one standard deviation increase in the ownership of 
monitoring institutions results in a 6% higher probability of completion. Nonetheless, the 
presence of these interested monitoring institutions results in higher final premiums and lower 
acquirer returns as well. Specifically, a standard deviation increase in their holdings leads to a 
4% higher probability of a bid revision and a 2.9% higher final premium (which translates into 
an additional $43 million for the average deal value of $1.49 billion). The end result is an 
acquirer announcement return that is lower by 0.6%. This lower return is economically 
important. It translates to a value reduction of over $79 million for the average acquirer in our 
sample. We also investigate monitoring institutions in the acquirer, noting that most of the 
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improvements from shareholder action that we hypothesize are sensible in the context of the 
target rather than the bidder. Indeed, controlling for monitoring institutions of the bidder does not 
affect our main results and does not incrementally explain bidder returns. 
Thus, as the theory predicts, these investors facilitate completion of the deal, but at terms 
that are more favorable than average for the target. In a way, their presence as a monitoring 
institution with some negotiating power produces effects similar to those found in Hartzell, Ofek 
and Yermack (2004). The difference is that, unlike target CEOs, they cannot be bought-off with 
private benefits, so the benefits they negotiate for completion certainty accrue to all target 
shareholders. 
Given that the terms are less favorable for the bidder, we test whether the presence of 
more monitoring institutions decreases the frequency of receiving a bid and find that it does. 
Relative to the 4% unconditional probability of receiving a bid, a standard deviation increase in 
monitoring institution ownership decreases the probability by 0.6%.  Nonetheless, the net effect 
of lower bid frequency against higher premium and completion rate conditional on a bid is 
approximately zero in terms of the overall wealth impact on firm shareholders (as shown by 
unconditional premium regressions following Comment and Schwert (1995)). This evidence is 
consistent with the expected effect of monitoring institutions being incorporated into the price of 
the firms they monitor. 
A clear concern is the endogeneity of the shares owned by monitoring institutions. We 
use exogenous changes in institutional holdings generated by Russell index reconstitutions to 
establish causality. Also, all of our tests control for the traditional measures of institutional 
ownership. Further, we extend the results and demonstrate their robustness with an extensive 
battery of additional tests. In addition to confirming robustness, these additional results are 
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consistent with our hypotheses about monitoring institutions and would be hard to reconcile with 
alternative explanations. We conclude that, as theory predicts, institutional investors are 
important to the outcome of an acquisition bid. However, due to limited resources and attention, 
these effects are only present when the stockholdings themselves are an important part of the 
institution’s portfolio.3 Thus our contribution comes both from suggesting a better measure of the 
relevant stakes for activist monitoring in a firm, and from demonstrating the net impact of such 
monitors on the acquisition process. 
Our paper is related to work by Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988), Bushee (1998), Chen, 
Harford and Li (2007), and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009). All of those authors focus on 
heterogeneity in institutional investors to identify which institutions are more likely to play an 
active monitoring role. Our work also contributes to the vast literature on mergers and 
acquisitions, particularly papers that study the role of institutional investors in the process (e.g. 
Huang, 2011) and those that examine the relative bargaining power of the parties (e.g. Ahern, 
2012). 
Our study proceeds as follows. We develop our hypothesis in section 2. In section 3 we 
describe our sample and the variables we use to examine institutional ownership. Section 4 
presents our empirical analyses and section 5 discusses additional tests we carry out in order to 
consider specific institutional characteristics. Section 6 explains the analyses we perform to 
assess the robustness of our results. Section 7 contains our conclusions. The Appendix provides 
the definition of all the variables we use in this study. 
                                                     
3 Concurrent work provides evidence that reaffirms this conclusion. Qayyum, Nagel and Roskelley (2014) find that 
total payout to shareholders increases with the firm’s portfolio importance to institutional investors. Pedersen (2014) 
finds that firms in which a blockholder has invested a large amount of capital lower the compensation of overpaid 
CEOs, reduce pay-for-luck for overpaid CEOs, strengthen the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance, 
and decrease their propensity to make value destroying acquisitions. 
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2. Hypothesis development 
Monitoring costs include the costs of gathering information, analyzing it, and acting on it, 
including the costs of influencing others (be they the firm managers or other shareholders).  
Institutions can find it beneficial to become specialized monitors. That is, the internalizable 
monitoring benefit to their larger and potentially longer-term investments can outweigh the costs 
of gathering information and acting on it. However, unless they hold their portfolio firms in 
equal proportion, they will not exert equal monitoring effort across their holdings. Just as the fact 
that they hold more shares than the atomistic investor makes it beneficial for them to monitor at 
all, the fact that they invest more of their funds in some firms makes it relatively more beneficial 
for them to monitor those firms. Moreover, due to limited attention (or limited resources), it 
makes sense for investors to allocate more effort to the largest positions in their portfolios. As a 
result, their monitoring activities will be higher for firms in which they have invested a larger 
fraction of their portfolio. 
Thus, we have our primary hypothesis, which is that monitoring activities in a given firm 
will be increasing in the importance of that firm to the institutions that hold it.  
For a given firm, we will use the term, “monitoring institutions,” to refer to those 
institutions investing a significant fraction of their portfolio in that firm. We test our primary 
hypothesis in the context of acquisitions. We predict that monitoring institutions will facilitate 
completion of an acquisition bid. They can do this either by voting or tendering their shares for 
the merger or by pressuring target managers to accept the bid.  
The effect of monitoring institutions on the premium is ambiguous. They may facilitate 
more deals, including some lower premium deals that may have been otherwise successfully 
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resisted by entrenched target managers. Conversely, their size and active interest may mitigate 
the coordination problem among target shareholders, allowing institutions to bargain for a higher 
premium. Nonetheless, in a model that controls for the other determinants of the premium, the 
incremental effect of the monitoring institutions should be to increase the final premium. Thus, 
we predict that, ceteris paribus, monitoring institutions increase the premium. 
The bargaining of the monitoring institutions is predicted to increase the premium to 
target shareholders, but should not increase the net synergies to the deal, which are determined 
by the operational fit of the acquirer and target. If monitoring institutions successfully bargain 
for more of the gains from the merger for target shareholders, then the net effect on acquirer 
shareholders will be negative. Thus, we predict that the incremental effect of the presence of 
monitoring institutions on acquirer announcement returns is negative. 
Taken alone, the prediction that monitoring institutions will facilitate bid completion 
would also imply that there should be more bids for firms with monitoring institutions. However, 
the prediction that these institutions will also influence the bargaining over the value of the 
synergies has the opposite implication for attracting bids in the first place. Thus, the presence of 
monitoring institutions has an ambiguous effect on the probability of being targeted. To explore 
these issues in greater detail, we conduct a number of multivariate analyses with data which is 
described in the next section. 
  
3. Sample formation and institutional ownership variables 
This section details the sample of mergers and acquisition (M&A) bids we analyze as 
well as the proxies we use to track the ownership by institutional investors in the target firms we 
study. 
7 
 
3.1. Sample overview 
We start with 7,292 M&A offers with a transaction value of at least $1 million tracked by 
the Securities Data Company (SDC) announced during 1984-2011 in which both the target and 
the acquirer are publicly traded U.S. companies. Our sample begins in 1984 because, as Chen, 
Harford and Li (2007) note, the M&A information in SDC is incomplete before 1984. Following 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), this initial sample 
excludes spinoffs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, self-tenders, privatizations, 
acquisitions of remaining interest, partial interests or assets, and transactions whose value 
relative to the bidder’s market capitalization at the fiscal year end prior to the merger 
announcement is less than 1%. We keep 3,377 deals in which targets and acquirers have stock 
market and accounting data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and from Compustat, respectively. We exclude transactions without coverage for the target 
company from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 13F database (formerly known as 
CDA/Spectrum). This database contains ownership information by institutional managers with 
greater than $100 million of equity securities under discretionary management; common stock 
positions greater than 10,000 shares or those valued at $200,000 or more. These criteria yield our 
final sample of 1,601 deals. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides the temporal and industrial distribution of our sample. We 
note that the annual number of bids declines at the beginning of our sample and also during 
2008-2009 which coincide with periods of economic contraction. Conversely, the number of 
transactions is higher during the 1998 to 2001 period of economic expansion when the stock 
market valuation is higher. The temporal distribution of our sample is in line with the merger 
activity reported in numerous prior studies. The industrial distribution of our sample targets is 
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based on the Fama and French (1997) classification. Targets are well scattered across industries 
with two exceptions. The Business Services (which includes software) and the Banking sectors 
exhibit some clustering with just over 12% and 21% of the target firms belonging to those 
industries, respectively. Moreover, targets in the Banking, Insurance, Real Estate and Trading 
(which, broadly defined, correspond to the Financial industry) account for over 27% of the 
observations. While most studies typically exclude the Financial industry, there were two merger 
waves in that industry during our sample period, accounting for its high representation. 
Nonetheless, because of the high concentration of targets in the Financial sector, in robustness 
tests we verify that our results are not driven by firms that belong to this industry. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports deal and target characteristics of our sample. Our summary 
statistics are similar in most important respects to the samples used elsewhere in the M&A 
literature. Among the 1,601 bids we analyze, about 18% are tender offers. This incidence 
compares favorably to that in Huang (2011). His sample of acquisitions during 1980-2008 
consists of 18% tender offers. Just over 91% of transactions in our sample consist of friendly 
mergers. This frequency also resembles that in Officer’s (2003) study of mergers during 1988-
2000.  The deals we study have a completion rate of just over 83%, which is similar to that of 
84.6% in Gaspar, Massa, and Matos’s (2005) M&A study of transactions during 1980-1999. 
Over 33% of the offers in our sample are paid in cash. This incidence is comparable to that of 
35% in Officer (2003). In 33.4% of our transactions, both the target and the bidder operate in 
different industries and exhibit a mean relative size of about 34.8%. These statistics are 
comparable to those in Duchin and Schmidt (2013). For their 1980-2009 M&A sample, they 
report an incidence of 36.5% of transactions in which the parties to the deal operate in different 
industries and a mean relative size of 37.9%. Our sample targets exhibit an average Tobin’s Q of 
9 
 
1.83. For a similar ratio, Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) report a mean value 
of 1.55 for the targets they study. The mean leverage for our target firms is slightly above 21% 
which is comparable to that of 20% in Cai and Sevilir (2012). 
3.2. Measures of institutional ownership 
Panel A in Table 2 reports summary statistics for different measures of institutional 
ownership. The first five rows in the table provide institutional ownership measured relative to 
the target firms’ shares outstanding which are the metrics most often used in the literature.  
Targets in our sample have an average of 1.5 blockholders and these blockholders account for 
about 5.5% of all institutions holding the target’s shares. Blockholders are defined as institutions 
owning at least 5% of the target’s shares. The mean (median) target equity ownership by 
blockholders in our sample is 12.66% (9.16%). On average, the largest shareholding by an 
institution is just over 8%. For a similar measure, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) report an average 
of 7.1%. We find that the top five institutions (in terms of ownership) control approximately 
21% of the target’s shares. Comparably, Hartzell and Starks (2003) report that the top five 
institutions in their sample control about 22% of the firm’s stock. 
Panel A also presents our proposed measures of institutional ownership. These measures 
capture the relative importance of the target firm to the institutional investor. As argued earlier, 
we hypothesize that monitoring activities in a given target firm will be increasing in the 
importance of that firm to the institutions that hold it. Based on this conjecture, we define 
monitoring institutions as those whose holding value in the target firm is in the top 10% of their 
portfolio, although all of our results continue to hold when we change the holding value threshold in the 
target to be in the top 5% of the institution’s portfolio. On average, targets in our sample are held by 
4 institutions classified as monitoring institutions and they account for only 2.4% of all 
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institutions holding the target shares. The mean total target equity ownership by monitoring 
institutions is 6.83%. The last three rows of panel A summarize the number, proportion and 
ownership of monitoring institutions in a firm, conditional on there being at least one monitoring 
institution present. There are 696 targets for which this is the case.  When monitoring institutions 
are present, the median number of monitors in the same firm is 3 and they represent about 5% of 
the institutions holding the firm. They control about 11% of the target at the median and 16% at 
the mean. 
Panel A shows important differences between the traditional blockholder metrics and our 
monitoring institutions measures. For instance, the distribution of the number of monitoring 
institutions is remarkably different from that for the number of blockholders. The latter variable 
exhibits a lower mean, a higher median, and a much lower standard deviation. Likewise, total 
ownership by institutional investors exceeds the total ownership by monitoring institutions in 
terms of both the mean and the median. These distributional differences are also evident when 
we look at the annual decomposition of the traditional blockholder and our proposed monitoring 
institutions variables in Panel B of Table 2. An alternative way to measure the importance of a 
position in an institution’s portfolio would be to use the dollar value of such position. To estimate this 
dollar value one would multiply the percentage of the firm’s equity the institution owns by the firm’s 
market value. To capture this, in some of our multivariate tests, we use the percentage of equity in the 
target owned by the institutional investor as the key independent variable while controlling for the target’s 
size. 
To offer a perspective from the institutional investors’ side, the last two rows of Panel A 
of Table 2 present statistic related to the 4,155 institutions that hold equity in our target firms. At 
the median, almost 11 positions (which may not necessarily include a sample target) are 
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considered monitored according to our definition. These positions represent just over 40 percent 
of the institution’s portfolio value. 
 
4. Institutional monitoring during acquisitions 
 In order to study the effect of monitoring institutions we perform a number of 
multivariate tests. The definitions for all of the variables used in these analyses are provided in 
the Appendix. 
4.1. Deal completion 
We first examine the relation between institutional ownership and deal completion. In 
Table 3, we report the estimation of four variants of a logit model in which the dependent 
variable equals one for completed deals and zero for withdrawn deals. Officer (2003) estimates a 
similar model. Therefore, except for the controls for institutional ownership, all independent 
variables in our regressions are similar to his. To account for the role of institutional investors, 
all the tests in Table 3 control for total institutional blockholder ownership in the target firm. In 
addition, in models (2), (3), and (4) we respectively add the number of monitoring institutions, 
the proportion of monitoring institutions, and the total ownership of monitoring institutions as 
control variables. 
 We note that the blockholder variable –an often-used proxy to control for institutional 
ownership in the literature– does not attain statistical significance in any of the tests reported in 
Table 3. In contrast, all of our proxies for monitoring institutions exhibit positive and statistically 
significant coefficients which imply a non-trivial effect on the likelihood that the deal 
materializes. For example, according to the marginal effect in model (4), a one standard 
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deviation increase in ownership by monitoring institutions is associated with a 6 percentage point 
increase in the probability of deal completion.  
Results for the other independent variables in Table 3 are consistent with those in the 
existing M&A literature. For example, transactions in our sample are about 19 percentage points 
more likely to complete if there is a target termination fee. This marginal effect is close to that of 
17 percentage points that Officer (2003) estimates for the same variable. Tender offers are 8 
percentage points more likely to go through, as are mergers in which the parties to the 
transaction are in the same industry. Comment and Schwert (1995) and Schwert (2000) argue 
that deal attitude is crucial for mergers to be completed. This is certainly true in our sample: 
Deals characterized as hostile are 39 percentage points less likely to be completed. Relatedly, 
Huang and Walkling (1987) find that the higher the merger announcement return obtained by 
acquisition targets the less likely these firms are to resist their takeover. Consistent with this, we 
find that deals in which targets get a higher merger announcement cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) are more likely to be completed.4 
4.2. Bid revisions 
An analysis of the bid revisions for the transactions in our sample provides a test of the 
potential monitoring by institutional investors and the effect of such oversight on the wealth of 
shareholders. We deﬁne a bid revision as the percent difference between the initial and ﬁnal bid 
premium offered for the target firm as recorded by SDC. We note that 161 (or 10.05%) of the 
bids in our sample suffer a revision. This incidence is similar to that of 10.32% in Bates, 
Lemmon and Linck (2006). 
                                                     
4 In untabulated analyses, we re-estimate Table 3 by expanding the controls to include governance variables (e.g.: G-
index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), board size, board ownership, board independence, busy boards, and 
Delaware incorporation). These tests, which are performed in a subsample of firms for which these variables are 
available from the RiskMetrics database, produce results that are qualitatively similar to those tabulated. 
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In Table 4, we estimate five bid revision logit regressions similar to those in Bates, 
Lemmon and Linck (2006). The dependent variable is set to one in model (1) if there is any bid 
revision, in model (2) if the bid is revised downward, and in models (3)-(5) if the bid is revised 
upward. The variables used to control for institutional ownership are similar to those we use in 
the deal completion analyses. 
Our bid revision tests indicate that the total ownership by blockholders is not related to 
any of our dependent variables. Conversely, all of our proxies for institutional monitoring are 
associated with increases in the bid premium offered to the target firms. According to the 
marginal effect we estimate in model (3), a one standard deviation increase in ownership by 
monitoring institutions increases the probability of an upward bid premium revision by 5.2 
percentage points. We note that the same monitoring institution variable is unrelated to the 
probability that the initial bid is revised downward.5 The results in Table 4 might be consistent 
with our hypothesis that institutions are more likely to monitor a firm when it becomes a 
takeover target –particularly when the company is an important holding in the institution’s 
portfolio.  
4.3. Acquisition premiums 
If a takeover target represents a key holding in an institution’s portfolio which leads this 
investor to intensify its monitoring, then we may observe such effect in the premium offered to 
the target. Therefore, we examine the role of both the traditional and our proposed measure of 
institutional ownership on the acquisition premiums. Before performing this analysis, we note 
that firms are unlikely to receive an acquisition bid by chance. Consequently, in Panel A of Table 
                                                     
5 In unreported tests we find that none of our other proxies for monitoring institutions (described in Table 2) are 
related to downward bid revisions. Likewise, none of the traditional blockholding or institutional ownership 
measures is related to any type of bid premium revision. 
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5, we estimate four logit regressions of the probability of becoming an acquisition target using 
154,227 firm-year observations during 1983-2011. In all tests, the dependent variable is set to 
one if the firm becomes a takeover target and is set to zero otherwise. Our specification 
augments those in Palepu (1986) due to the inclusion of our controls for institutional ownership.  
The results in Panel A indicate that total institutional blockholder ownership has no 
significant effect on the probability of becoming a target. In contrast, all of our monitoring 
institutions’ proxies attain negative and significant coefficients. The marginal effect we estimate 
in model (4) of Panel A indicates that a single standard deviation increase in ownership by 
monitoring institutions lowers the likelihood of becoming a target by 0.6%. To put this result in 
perspective, the unconditional probability of becoming a target in the sample analyzed in Panel 
A of Table 5 is 4.41%. One potential interpretation of this result is that a firm that is operating 
efficiently (due to the oversight of monitoring institutions) is less likely to be disciplined by the 
takeover market. However, without an analysis of the merger premiums offered to firms with 
monitoring institutions (which we conduct next) the foregoing conjecture cannot be fully 
substantiated.  
Following the two-step procedure suggested in Heckman (1979) we address issues 
related to self-selection because firms do not randomly become acquisition targets. Therefore, we 
estimate an inverse Mill’s ratio from each of the four models in Panel A in Table 5 and 
respectively use them as additional controls in the four premium regressions we report in Panel B 
of Table 5. These regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects and use the four-week 
premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable, where we follow Officer (2003) and limit the 
premium to values between 0 and 2 (or 200%). Our target premium tests closely follow the 
specification in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008). In model (1), the main 
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independent variable is the total ownership held by blockholders in the target firm. In model (2), 
(3), and (4) the independent variables of interest are the number of monitoring institutions, the 
proportion of monitoring institutions, and the total ownership of monitoring institutions, 
respectively.  
The coefficient for the blockholder variable is not statistically significant in any of the 
premium regressions reported in Panel B of Table 5. However, the same tests document an 
economically important positive association between all of our monitoring institutions proxies 
and the takeover premiums. According to the estimates in model (4), increasing the ownership of 
monitoring institutions by one standard deviation translates into a premium increase of 2.9 
percentage points. For the average transaction in our sample, this increase represents an 
additional $43 million in terms of deal value for the target shareholders. These results support 
our view that institutions do monitor targets when targets account for an important holding in the 
institutions’ portfolios.6 
We note that the estimates for several control variables in Panel B of Table 5 are in 
agreement with the existing M&A literature. For example, acquisition premiums are inversely 
related to the size of the target firm (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2008), to the 
relative size of the parties (Cai and Sevilir, 2012), and also decline when the transaction is 
characterized as a merger of equals (Wulf, 2004, and Wang and Xie, 2009). In contrast, 
premiums increase when the transaction includes a target termination fee (Officer, 2003), when 
there are competing bids (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005), when cash is used as the sole 
medium to pay for the consideration (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2010) and when the deals are 
                                                     
6 We also examine smaller portfolio holdings by defining a “low monitoring” position if the target firm is in the 
bottom 10% of the institution’s portfolio. In a premium regression similar to model (4) of Panel B in Table 5, the 
estimate for the total ownership of low monitoring institutions is not statistically significant (p
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characterized as tender offers (Bates, Lemmon and Linck, 2006). As in Massa and Xu (2013), 
more liquid targets also get higher premiums. The fact that the effect of monitoring institutions 
on premiums is robust the inclusion of the target’s liquidity (measured following Amihud, 2002) 
is important given the academic debate on whether liquidity strengthens or weakens institutional 
monitoring (see Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), and Back, 
Li, and Ljungqvist (2014) among others). 
4.3.1. Activist investors 
  Recent research finds that investors perceive activism (particularly by hedge funds) to be 
value-increasing. For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) show that the 
announcement of hedge fund activism is met by abnormal returns of more than 7%. Moreover, 
Klein and Zur (2009) document that firms exhibit even larger abnormal returns (of 10.2%) upon 
the filing of an SEC Schedule 13D in which the hedge fund activist investor vows to confront the 
firm’s management.7  Greenwood and Schor (2009) conclude that hedge funds’ success in 
forcing a firm (in which they have invested) into a takeover accounts for the high returns to 
activism documented in the literature. This conclusion is based on their empirical results 
showing that firms subject to activism (i) earn high returns primarily if they are eventually taken 
over and (ii) earn average abnormal returns that are not statistically distinguishable from zero if 
they are not acquired. 
  Using a classification method similar to that in Greenwood and Schor (2009), we find 
that among the 4,155 different institutional investors that hold shares in our sample targets, 165 
                                                     
7 Schedule 13D is a filing that must be submitted to the SEC within 10 days by anyone who acquires beneficial 
ownership of more than 5% of any class of publicly traded securities in a public company. Sections 4 and 5 of 
Schedule 13D are respectively labeled “Purpose of Transaction” and “Interest in Securities of the Issuer.” These are 
intended to shed light on the objectives of the party buying the shares.  
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are coded as activists.8 In our sample of 1,601 deals, 1,189 targets are held by at least one activist 
investor. To evaluate the potential effects of activism in our setting, we define an Activists (0,1) 
variable which is set to “1” when at least one monitoring institution holding the target’s shares is 
identified as an activist and set to “0” otherwise. In an untabulated test, we use this variable to 
estimate the following variant of model 4 in Panel B of Table 5: 
Merger premium = Total ownership of monitoring institutions + Activists (0,1) + Total 
ownership of monitoring institutions × Activists (0,1) + Other controls         (1) 
 The coefficient for the standalone monitoring institution variable is 0.2306 (p-value = 
0.0350) while for the interaction term it is 0.3783 (p-value = 0.0574). The joint effect of these 
variables is also statistically significant. These estimates imply that raising the total ownership of 
monitoring institutions by a single standard deviation when at least one institution is an activist is 
associated with a 4.62% increase in the merger premium. This result indicates that the effect of 
monitoring institutions is magnified when at least one institution is classified as an activist 
investor.  
4.4. Unconditional premiums  
In their study of poison pills, Comment and Schwert (1995, p.30) argue that “The 
estimated effect of antitakeover measures on the unconditional premium is of interest because it 
is a net effect of a decrease in the premium if antitakeover devices deter offers and an increase if 
they increase premiums in successful takeovers.” Unlike poison pills, institutional ownership is 
not an antitakeover device. Nevertheless, the tests in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that monitoring 
institutions deter takeover offers as we find an inverse association between these institutions and 
the probability that a firm becomes a takeover target. At the same time, in Panel B of Table 5 we 
                                                     
8 Prominent activists in our sample include, among others, Breeden Capital Management, D.E. Shaw & Co., 
Discovery Group, Greenlight Capital, Icahn Associates, and Riley Investment Management. 
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find that monitoring institutions are associated with higher takeover premiums. To examine the 
net effect of these institutions in the gains to target shareholders we use the method in Comment 
and Schwert (1995) to estimate unconditional premium regressions. We run these tests, which 
are reported in Table 6, in a sample of 154,227 firm-years with data available from CRSP and 
Compustat during 1983-2011. As in Comment and Schwert, we set the premium to zero in 
nontakeover firm-years. Our unconditional premium regressions control for institutional 
ownership in a manner similar to that in previous multivariate tests.  
The estimates in Table 6 show that the unconditional premium is not a statistically 
significant function of either the blockholder variable or our monitoring institutions proxies. 
Therefore, together with our earlier results, the tests in Table 6 suggest that the net effect of 
lower bid frequency against higher premium and completion rate conditional on a bid is 
approximately zero in terms of the overall wealth impact on target shareholders. This evidence 
suggests that monitoring institutions are relevant—their effect is already incorporated into the 
price of the firms they monitor. Further, since the positive impact of the monitoring institutions 
is priced, the increase in premium we find conditional on a bid underestimates their full impact 
on firm value. Thus, the 2.9% higher premium for a one standard deviation increase in 
monitoring institutions’ holdings can be viewed as a conservative estimate of their value impact. 
4.5. Endogeneity 
Recent work by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) shows that institutions appear reluctant to 
invest in companies with weak corporate governance. Their findings suggest that even if 
institutions are able and motivated (due to higher stockholdings) to monitor a firm, they prefer to 
invest in companies in which monitoring may not be necessary. Using a similar logic and in our 
setting, it is possible that institutions raise their shareholdings in firms that are likely to be 
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acquired or are particularly likely to earn higher premiums if they become acquisition targets. 
Under any of these possibilities, causality runs in the opposite direction and our assertion that the 
higher deal completion probabilities and takeover premiums we observe obtain due to the 
influence of monitoring institutions would be incorrect. 
 To address the endogeneity problem just described, we employ a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design approach in the context of an instrumental variable (IV) estimation similar 
to that in Schmidt (2012) and in Crane, Michenaud and Weston (2012).9 Following their 
empirical scheme, our identification strategy exploits the nature of the Russell index composition 
and annual reconstitution. Every year in June, the largest 1,000 firms (in terms of market 
capitalization) are selected to make up the Russell 1000 index and the next 2,000 firms are 
included in the Russell 2000 index. Since both indices are value-weighted, institutions tracking 
them will have to adjust their holdings in particular firms when these companies switch from one 
index to the other, enter one of the indices for the first time, or leave an index. These adjustments 
are likely to create a non-trivial exogenous discontinuity in a firm’s ownership structure. Indeed, 
Chang and Hong (2012) find that firms that are first included in the Russell 2000 index 
experience higher returns after the index is reconstituted. Those authors argue that this 
phenomenon is due to price pressure that results from higher institutional demand for the new 
Russell 2000 stocks. 
In fact, all firms (affected or not) might change in terms of their weight and relative 
importance to the institutions that hold them. Consequently, our instrument satisfies the 
relevancy condition because index changes are correlated with changes in monitoring 
institutions. Since inclusion in the Russell indices is based on market capitalization, variations in 
                                                     
9 See, Lee and Lemieux (2010) for technical details on the regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach in 
general and Roberts and Whited (2012) for a primer on the fuzzy RDD in particular. 
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index membership are not random, but correlated with changes in market capitalization. 
Nonetheless, a firm’s index membership becomes random when controlling for differences in 
market capitalization. In this setting, our change in the number monitoring institutions instrument 
satisfies the exclusion restriction because it is conditionally random: it consists of the change in 
index membership conditional on changes in market capitalization. As in Schmidt (2012), 
controls for the change in market capitalization include a continuous measure tracking how many 
rankings the raw market capitalization changed (change in ranking in Russell( t-1 , t )) and its 
squared term, respectively. 
Consequently, to evaluate the causal relationship between monitoring institutions and bid 
premiums we use an IV approach based on the changes in holdings by these institutions upon 
index reconstitutions. These changes in holdings are likely to change the number, proportion, and 
total ownership of the monitoring institutions in our sample.  
To implement the IV estimator, we first regress changes in the number of monitoring 
institutions on a set of instruments and control variables. As in Schmidt (2012), the instruments 
consist of discrete changes (dummy variables to indicate index switches, index departures, and 
index entrances) and continuous changes tracked by differences in the annual Russell Rankings. 
We employ the methods outlined by Staiger and Stock (1997) to test the validity of these 
instruments. 
For the first stage test, we use 154,227 firm-year observations with data available from 
both CRSP and Compustat during 1983-2011. During this period, we track 31,407 changes 
related to a Russell 1000/2000 reconstitution as follows: 4,041 firms (or 2.6%) switch from the 
1000 to the 2000 index, 19,348 are removed from the 2000 index, 2,237 switch from the 2000 to 
the 1000 index, and 5,781 are newly added to the 2000 index. For our purposes, the annual 
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Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions directly affect 216 of our 1,601 sample targets as 
follows: 32 switch from the 1000 to the 2000 index, 99 are removed from the 2000 index, 24 
switch from the 2000 to the 1000 index, and 61 are new additions to the 2000 index. It is 
important to note that some targets firms that are not directly affected by these changes could be 
indirectly impacted by index reconstitutions involving other (index) firms that are held in the 
portfolio of the same institutional investors. In other words, the weight of a target firm in the 
institution’s portfolio could change due to changes in weights of non-target portfolio firms 
directly affected by an index reconstitution. 
The first stage regression of the change in the number monitoring institutions is reported 
as model (1) in Table 7. We calculate changes in the number of monitoring institutions from the 
end of the third quarter in year t-1 to the end of the third quarter in year t because index 
reconstitutions occur annually at the end of May/beginning of June.10 According to the estimates, 
if a firm switches from the Russell 1000 last year to the Russell 2000 in the current year, the 
company exhibits a decline of about one monitoring institution. This finding is broadly 
consistent with Schmidt (2012), who uses switches to the Russell 2000 to identify exogenous 
increases in passive investors. 
In the second-stage test, the fitted value for the change in the number of monitoring 
institutions becomes the key explanatory variable in the premium regression reported in model 
(2) of Table 7.11 The coefficient for the instrumented variable of the change in the number of 
monitoring institutions is positive and statistically significant. This finding indicates that firms 
that become a top holding in an institution’s portfolio (due to Russell index reconstitutions) 
                                                     
10 According to this time line, deals in our sample announced in the fourth quarter occur in year t whereas those 
announced anytime during the first three quarters occur in year t+1.  
11 The standard errors in this regression are adjusted for the fact that the instrumental variable for monitoring 
institutions is estimated. See Roberts and Whited (2012) for a discussion of this issue. 
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receive higher takeover premiums. This result suggests that these monitoring investors are 
responsible for the higher premium and, therefore, mitigates the concern that causality runs in the 
opposite direction. The results in Table 7, which exploit the exogenous nature of the Russell 
index reconstitutions, also alleviate the concern that some institutions in our sample somehow 
have the ability to predict or anticipate takeovers which, in turn, leads these investors to 
overweight certain firms in their portfolios. Moreover, the index reconstitutions results also cast 
doubt on the idea that our results are mostly driven by institutions that purposely overweight 
certain positions (relative to a benchmark). Indeed, our IV analyses suggest that an exogenous 
shock to an institution’s portfolio weights (and not a pre-determined investment strategy) appears 
to induce the institutions to monitor portfolio positions that experience an increase in weight.12 
We employ a similar empirical procedure to instrument for the proportion of monitoring 
institutions as well as for the total ownership of monitoring institutions. The second stage results 
for these proxies, which are respectively reported as models (4) and (6) in Table 7, also suggest 
that monitoring institutions cause target firms to earn higher premiums. Overall, the results in 
Table 7 support the hypothesis that institutional monitoring will be greatest when the target firm 
represents a significant allocation of funds in the institution’s portfolio.  
4.6. Acquirer returns, division of gains, and synergies 
  To test whether monitoring institutions of the target firm affect the returns to acquirers, in 
Panel A of Table 8, we run four ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the three-day merger 
CAR meeting the bidders in our sample. This CAR is centered on the acquisition announcement 
                                                     
12 Nevertheless, the IV tests do not rule out the possibility that some targets are held by certain “types” of 
institutions and that we are just picking up targets with large weights in the portfolios of those institutions. Ideally, 
this issue could be addressed econometrically by including institutions’ fixed effects in our analyses. We note, 
however, that this is not feasible since we have over 4,000 institutions holding shares in 1,601 targets. Nonetheless, 
in section 5 we study the effect of institutions based on their propensity to monitor (passive vs. active types) as in 
Bushee (1998) and also based on their independence from the firm’s management (pressure sensitive vs. pressure 
resistant types) as in Brickley et al. (1985).   
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day. We follow the M&A literature in order to properly specify our acquirer return regressions. 
Therefore, all models in Panel A control for variables similar to those in the acquirer return tests 
performed by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). 
In our acquirer return tests, we expand the specification in those studies by including our proxies 
for institutional ownership. 
  The estimates in Panel A of Table 8 indicate that acquirer returns decrease in our target 
monitoring institutions proxies. Using the estimate in model (4), a one standard deviation 
increase in the ownership of monitoring institutions is associated with a 0.62% decrease in the 
return to the acquirer. This drop implies a value decline of over $79 million for the average 
bidder in our sample with a market capitalization of $12.7 billion.13  
  Together with the results from our bid premium regressions, our acquirer return tests 
indicate that monitoring institutions increase the bargaining power or effort of the target 
managers, resulting in them negotiating a bigger “piece of the pie” for their shareholders. To 
evaluate how the pie is divided we follow the procedure in Ahern (2012). Specifically, in Panel 
B of Table 8 we estimate a set of regressions in which the dependent variable is the target’s gain 
relative to the acquirer’s gain. To construct this variable we first estimate the target $CAR and 
the acquirer $CAR as the cumulative abnormal return earned over three days surrounding the 
merger announcement adjusted by the equally weighted Center for Research in Security Prices 
index and then multiplied by market equity of the firm two days before the merger 
announcement. Next, we compute the target’s $CAR minus the acquirer’s $CAR. We then divide 
this difference by the sum of acquirer and target market values 50 trading days before the merger 
                                                     
13 Some of the control variables in Table 8 produce results that conform to the existing literature. For example, as in 
Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2012), acquirer returns are higher when cash is used to buy the target firm. Like 
Moeller et al. (2004), we find that acquirer returns are lower in M&A intensive industries (i.e., those with a high 
liquidity index). As in Roosenboom, Schlingemann, and Vasconcelos (2013), we also find an inverse relation 
between the acquirers’ liquidity and the announcement returns meeting these firms. 
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announcement to obtain our relative gain dependent variable. All of the control variables in 
Panel B of Table 8 are similar to those in Panel A. However, to conserve space, we only report 
the variables tracking institutional ownership. 
  Model (1) of Panel B indicates that ownership by blockholders is unrelated to the division 
of gains. In contrast, the other regressions in Panel B show that when monitoring institutions are 
present, targets get a relatively higher share of the gains. According to model (4) for example, a 
one standard deviation increase in the total ownership of monitoring institutions is associated 
with an increase of 1.09% in the relative gain of the target vs. the acquirer per dollar of total 
market value. Thus, the effect of monitoring institutions is economically important because in 
our sample the unconditional mean relative gain is 3.66%, which is close to that of 3.52% 
reported by Ahern (2012) who analyzes transactions during 1980-2008. 
  Next, we evaluate whether monitoring institutions affect the synergies in M&A deals. To 
do so, in untabulated tests, we estimate four OLS regressions of the total percentage synergistic 
gain from acquisitions. We calculate this measure as the three day CAR for a value-weighted 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target. As in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), the CAR is 
centered on the merger announcement date. Our synergy regressions use control variables similar 
to those in the synergy tests reported by Wang and Xie (2009). To their specification we add our 
measures of institutional ownership in the target firm. The results show that neither the 
traditional blockholder proxies nor our monitoring institutions measures are statistically related 
to synergies. These findings support our prediction that monitoring institutions should not 
increase the net synergies to the deal. 
  Collectively, our results show that M&A deals in which there is oversight by monitoring 
institutions of the target firm exhibit a transfer of some of the synergy gain from acquirer 
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shareholders to target shareholders. The fact that the ownership structure of the target firm 
affects the gains to the acquirer is potentially important because it raises the possibility that 
cross-ownership by institutions can account for this result. We address this issue in one of the 
robustness tests provided in section 6. 
 
5. Additional analyses 
  Studies by Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Bushee (1998), Hartzell and Starks (2003), 
and Schmidt (2012) (among others) investigate whether institutional investors exert effort to 
influence management. Although the evidence on this issue is mixed, a reasonable conclusion 
from these papers is that some—but not all—institutional investors appear to influence 
management on some corporate activities (such as antitakeover amendments, R&D investment 
decisions, and CEO compensation). Based on this literature and because institutional investors 
tend to have a particular focus, we employ several existing methods to identify institutions more 
likely to undertake a monitoring role. Specifically, we use classifications for pressure sensitivity 
(Brickley, Lease and Smith’s (1988)), horizon (Bushee’s (1998) and (Gaspar, Massa and Matos’ 
(2005)), active management (Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009)), and blockholder status.  
5.1. Pressure sensitivity  
  Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) note that some institutions are not really independent 
of management because they are linked to a portfolio firm through other business activities. 
Because insurance companies, banks, and nonbank trusts are more likely to be subject to 
management’s influence, those authors define them to be pressure sensitive institutions.  
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  To assess the effect of potential pressure exerted by the target’s management on an 
institution holding the target’s shares, we expand the specification of the premium tests reported 
in Table 5 to estimate the following (untabulated) regression: 
Merger premium = Total ownership of monitoring institutions + Independent institutions (0,1) + 
Total ownership of monitoring institutions × Independent institutions (0,1) + Other controls    (2) 
  In this test, the dummy variable is set to “1” when at least one monitoring institution 
holding the target’s shares is classified as an independent institution (using the definition in 
Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) that adjusts the classification in Brickley et al. to fit the Spectrum 
dataset taxonomy). Thus, independent institutions include investment companies (from Spectrum 
type 3 institutions), investment advisors (from Spectrum type 4 institutions), and public pension 
funds, foundations, and endowments (from Spectrum type 5 institutions). 
  The estimate for the monitoring institution variable is 0.2070 (p-value = 0.0635). The 
coefficient on the interaction term in the above model is 0.5274 (p-value =0.0660). The 
combined effect of these variables is also statistically significant. According to these results, a 
one standard deviation increase in the total ownership of monitoring institutions in the presence 
of at least one independent institution is associated with a premium increase of 6.44%. This 
result suggests that the effect of monitoring institutions appears stronger when the investors are 
more likely to be independent from management. 
5.2. Horizon  
  Bushee (1998) classifies institutions into three groups—dedicated, quasi-indexer, and 
transient—based on their past investment patterns in the areas of portfolio turnover, 
diversification, and momentum trading. While transient institutions are not expected to exert 
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effort to influence managers, dedicated institutions (and perhaps quasi-indexers) are more likely 
to perform the full monitoring role of gathering information and attempting to influence 
managers. To consider this possibility, we refine our tests by developing a measure that 
intersects our monitoring institutions proxies with those classified by Bushee’s method as 
dedicated and quasi-indexer investors. We use this measure to identify transactions in which the 
target firm is held by monitoring institutions and also by institutions with investment styles 
suited to monitoring activities. With this information, we estimate a regression by expanding 
model 4 in Panel B of Table 5 as follows: 
Merger premium = Total ownership of monitoring institutions + Dedicated (0,1) 
+ Total ownership of monitoring institutions × Dedicated (0,1) + Control variables 
 
(3)
  In this regression, the variable Dedicated (0,1) is set to “1” when at least one monitoring 
institution holding the target’s shares is classified as dedicated or quasi-indexer and is set to “0” 
otherwise. The estimate for the Total ownership of monitoring institution is 0.2170 (p-value = 
0.0592) and the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.4610 (p-value = 0.0438). In addition, the 
joint effect of these variables is statistically significant. According to these estimates, a one 
standard deviation increase in the total ownership of monitoring institutions when at least one is 
a dedicated investor is related to a 5.63% increase in the merger premium. Thus, the effect of 
monitoring institutions strengthens whenever they are also dedicated investors. 
  Since it is probably not appropriate to group quasi-indexers and dedicated investors in a 
single category, we also estimate Model (3) by only including the latter investors in the 
Dedicated (0,1) indicator variable. The parameter for the interaction variable is now 0.6062 (p-
value = 0.0039) and the joint effect between the interaction and the standalone monitoring 
institution variable is still statistically significant. These estimates imply a 7.4% increase in the 
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merger premium for a single standard deviation increase in the total ownership of monitoring 
institutions when at least one of them is a dedicated investor. This suggests that some of the 
quasi-indexers are behaving passively since the effect from combining dedicated and quasi-
indexer is lower. 
  Similarly, Gaspar et al. (2005) focus on portfolio turnover as the defining characteristic 
of the institution and argue for better monitoring in the presence of lower turnover. We classify 
an institution as low-turnover if its average portfolio churn rate (how frequently it rotates the 
positions on all the stocks in its portfolio) over the four most recent quarters (immediately 
preceding the merger announcement) is in the bottom third of the distribution of all institutions 
covered in the 13F database at the quarter end. We use this classification to define a dummy 
variable which we set to “1” if at least one monitoring institution is also a low-turnover (long 
investment horizon) institution and set to ‘0” otherwise. With this dummy variable we expand 
the specification presented in Table 5 (Model 4 of Panel B) and estimate the following 
regression: 
Merger premium = Total ownership of monitoring institutions + Low-turnover (0,1) + Total 
ownership of monitoring institutions × Low-turnover (0,1) + Control variables          (4) 
  The parameter estimate on the interaction term is 0.3977 (p-value = 0.0545) whereas the 
stand alone coefficient for the monitoring variable is 0.2162 (p-value = 0.0392). The combined 
effect of these variable is also statistically significant. Our estimates imply a 4.86% increase in 
the merger premium related to a one standard deviation increase in the total ownership of 
monitoring institutions when at least one is classified as low-turnover. This result suggests that, 
whenever their investment horizon is long, the impact of monitoring institutions intensifies. 
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5.3. Active share 
  Equity fund managers can outperform their fund’s benchmark by taking positions that are 
different from those in the benchmark. Based on this premise, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
define Active Share as the portion of portfolio holdings that differs from the benchmark index 
holdings. Their results show that mutual funds with the highest Active Share significantly 
outperform their benchmarks. To evaluate to role of Active Share in our setting, we classify an 
institution to be active if its Active Share is in the top third of the distribution of all institutions 
tracked in the 13F database during the last quarter ending prior to the acquisition announcement 
(analogous to the classification used by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). We use this definition to 
define an indicator variable which is equal to “1” if at least one monitoring institution is also 
classified as active. The indicator is equal to “0” otherwise. With this variable we estimate the 
following OLS model: 
Merger premium = Total ownership of monitoring institutions + Active (0,1) + Total ownership 
of monitoring institutions × Active (0,1) + Control variables            (5) 
  The results of regression (5) suggest that the effect of monitoring institutions is stronger 
if they are also classified as active investors. The estimate on the interaction term is 0.3619 (p-
value = 0.0399) and the stand alone monitoring institution coefficient is 0.2128 (p-value = 
0.0392). Moreover, the joint effect of these variables is statistically significant as well. 
According to these coefficients, raising the total ownership of monitoring institutions by a single 
standard deviation when at least one institution is classified as active is associated with a 4.42% 
increase in the merger premium. 
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5.4. Monitoring institutions that are also blockholders 
  The rationale for our monitoring institution measure is that their motivation to exert 
influence on management increases with the size of their shareholdings in a given firm. The 
rationale for the 5%-blockholding measures traditionally used in the literature is that firms must 
pay attention to their largest shareholders. To study potential differences between institutions 
with incentives to monitor versus traditional blockholders, we test whether one of these 
characteristics dominates the other and also estimate their joint effect. The joint effect is of 
interest because it could provide evidence of coordination between investors with an incentive to 
monitor and those with the blocks to have the most influence. To capture this, we estimate the 
following variant of model 4 in Panel B of Table 5: 
Merger premium = Total ownership of monitoring institutions + Number of blockholders + 
Total ownership of monitoring institutions × Number of blockholders + Controls 
 
(6)
 In the above specification, the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.7433). Likewise, the coefficient for the blockholder variable is not 
statistically different from zero (p-value = 0.4863). However, as with our tabulated analyses, the 
standalone coefficient for the monitoring institutions variable is positive and statistically 
significant (0.2002, p-value = 0.0248). The joint effect of these variables is also significant. 
These results suggest that even if the monitoring institution is not a blockholder, its incentive to 
monitor is enough to have an effect.14  
 
6. Robustness 
                                                     
14 We also redefine blockholder to be equal to 1 only when one of the monitoring institutions is also a blockholder. 
The interaction term is still insignificant (p-value = 0.4444). 
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In this section, we perform a number of additional tests in order to probe the reliability of 
the reported findings, assess the robustness of our results, and consider alternative explanations. 
6.1. Corporate governance 
  To address concerns that monitoring institutions simply invest in targets that are better 
governed and, therefore, more likely to earn higher premiums, we conduct a two-part analysis 
similar to that in Chen, Harford and Li (2007). The first step includes estimating three 
(untabulated) regressions that use the number of monitoring institutions, the proportion of 
monitoring institutions, and the total ownership of monitoring institutions as the respective 
dependent variables. The independent variables in these tests include the target’s size, lagged 
stock return, leverage, Tobin’s Q, and the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate 
governance index (G-index), board size (Yermack, 1996) and board ownership (Denis, Denis, 
and Sarin, 1997) as well as indicators for Delaware incorporation (Daines, 2001), independent 
boards (Weisbach, 1988), and busy boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Monitoring ownership is 
not significantly explained by any of the governance variables. These results do not suggest that 
institutional monitors tend to systematically hold shares in better performing or better governed 
companies.  
  Next, we retain the residuals from the three monitoring institutions tests we estimate in 
the first step described above. These residuals (which measure the abnormal level of our 
monitoring institutions proxies) are used as the key independent variables in premium 
regressions which are specified similar to those in Table 4. Models 1, 2, and 3 of Panel A in 
Table 9 report the estimates for the abnormal level of monitoring institutions variables. These 
estimates capture the oversight role by monitoring institutions that is purged from the effect of 
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either the governance or the performance of the target firm. We find that the abnormal 
monitoring institutions estimates are positive and significantly associated with the bid premium.   
  These findings (in tandem with those from the endogeneity tests in Table 7) assuage the 
concern that our results are the byproduct of institutional monitors investing according to the 
better governance or the superior performance of the target firms. 
6.2. Acquisition premium and acquirer return alternatives  
The regressions presented in Table 5 Panel B use the four-week premium reported by 
SDC as the dependent variable. In untabulated analyses, we re-estimate the same regressions 
using three different premium measures as dependent variables. The first is the target’s CAR 
during the window (-20, +1) relative to the announcement date as in Jarrell and Poulsen (1989). 
Our second measure follows Schwert (1996) and uses the target’s CAR during the window (-42, 
+126). Our third measure uses the “combined” merger premium defined in Officer (2003) as the 
dependent variable.15 The results of the regressions that use the three alternative measures also 
document a positive and economically important association between monitoring institutions and 
the takeover premium. For instance, raising the total ownership of monitoring institutions by one 
standard deviation is associated with an increase of 3.49% in the combined premium. 
  We also estimate several regressions similar to those reported in Table 8. In these tests 
we replace the acquirer’s CAR over the (-1, +1) window with (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) CARs. 
Looking at Panel B of Table 9, we note that the coefficients for the total ownership of monitoring 
institutions in the target firm are still negatively related to the acquirer’s return as measured 
                                                     
15 Specifically, following Officer (2003), we first estimate a premium based on component data using the aggregate 
value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then 
estimate premiums based on initial price and final price data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. 
All premium measures are then deflated by the target’s market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. 
The combined premium is based on the component measure if it is greater than zero and less than two. Otherwise, 
the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure if initial price data are missing). 
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during these alternative windows. In contrast, estimates for the target blockholder variable do not 
attain statistical significance at conventional levels. 
6.3. Excluding targets in the financial industry  
  As noted earlier, just over one fifth of the targets in our sample operate in the Financial 
sector (see Panel A of Table 1). Although all of our multivariate tests include industry fixed-
effects, we check whether our results hold if we remove these targets from our regressions. The 
tests in Panels C and D of Table 9 exclude targets operating in the Financial industry from the 
analysis. In Panel C of Table 9 we report the coefficients for our monitoring institutions variables 
from premium regressions similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 5. As with the earlier 
results, all variables exhibit positive and significant coefficients. Panel D of Table 9 reports 
estimates for our monitoring institution proxies from acquirer return tests that follow the 
specification reported in Table 8. The results in Panel D of Table 9 continue to document an 
inverse association between our monitoring institutions proxies and the return to the bidder 
firms. In general, the results in Panels C and D of Table 9 alleviate concerns that our findings are 
driven by observations in the Financial industry. 
6.4. Holdings aggregation and institutional size 
  Institutions aggregate their holdings across funds and report only the combined holdings 
in their 13F forms. This is unlikely to be a concern in our setting since, within an institution, 
fund managers might not have similar (monitoring versus trading) objectives, share information, 
or coordinate effort. Put differently, treating these funds as a single institution most likely biases 
against our finding a monitoring effect to the extent that multiple funds within the same 
institution take uncoordinated positions (and actions) in a single firm. On the other hand, 
aggregation could be a concern if the funds within these institutions coordinate their efforts. This 
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possibility, together with the fact that larger institutions are more likely to be influential (Basak 
and Pavlova, 2013), suggests that our results could stem from the large size and influence of 
these investors. 
  To evaluate whether aggregation and large institutional investor size could be affecting 
our results, we begin by ranking the 4,155 institutions in our sample according to the number of 
funds within the investor. On average, the top 20 institutions have 52 individual funds. In terms 
of size, these 20 institutions account for 36% of the market value represented by our 4,155 
sample institutions during the last quarter ending prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
After excluding the top 20, the remaining institutions on average have seven individual funds.  
  In untabulated tests, we eliminate the top 20 institutions from the analyses. The purpose 
here is not to remove aggregation entirely (this would all but exhaust our sample), but to assess 
whether there is any change in the results that would suggest that aggregation in general –and 
institutional size in particular– is a key driver of our results. Removing the top 20 does not 
qualitatively alter our main findings. The tests that exclude these institutions indicate that 
increasing the total ownership of monitoring institutions by one standard deviation is associated 
with (i) a premium increase of 2.75%, and (ii) a decline in the M&A announcement CAR to the 
acquirer of -0.55%.  
6.5. Monitoring institutions of the acquirer 
  Just as institutions monitor targets in which they have significant holdings, acquirers 
could be subject to similar oversight by their own monitoring institutions. However, a possible 
caveat with this conjecture is that most of the bargaining power improvements that would come 
from shareholder action would be on the target side where shareholder coordination is critical in 
responding to the proposed merger. With this issue in mind, we recalculate our premium and 
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acquirer return regressions including an additional explanatory variable: a (0,1) dummy variable 
set to “1” whenever the acquirer shares are held by at least one monitoring institution. The 
dummy is set to “0” otherwise. All of our results are robust to the inclusion of this control. 
Moreover, the dummy variable does not attain significant coefficients in either the premium or 
the acquirer return regressions. 
  In untabulated analyses, we also test whether, under oversight by their own monitoring 
institutions, bidders are more likely to withdraw from bad acquisition deals. To do so, we 
estimate three logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if the deal is 
withdrawn. The dependent variable is equal to zero otherwise. We also define a bad acquisition 
(0,1) indicator that is set to one if the merger CAR on the acquirer is negative and statistically 
significant. For all other CARs the indicator is set to zero. In the three logit regressions we 
interact the bad acquisition indicator with our three proxies for monitoring institutions of the 
bidders, respectively. In all tests, the coefficients for the interaction terms are positive but not 
statistically significant. 
6.6. Alternative blockholder measures 
  In all of our multivariate tests we use the total ownership by blockholders in the target 
firm to control for the holdings by institutions measured relative to the target firm’s outstanding 
shares. This variable fails to achieve statistical significance in our analyses. We repeat all of our 
multivariate tests replacing the blockholder ownership with (i) the number of blockholders, (ii) 
the proportion of blockholders, (iii) the ownership by the largest five institutions, and (iv) the 
ownership of the largest institution. None of these alternative measures of institutional ownership 
in the target firm attains significant coefficients. In contrast, our monitoring institution proxies 
continue to obtain statistically significant estimates in all tests. 
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6.7. Cross-holdings  
  Our results show that institutions for which the target constitutes a top ten holding are 
associated with higher premiums paid for the targets and with lower acquirer returns. Matvos and 
Ostrovsky (2008) argue that gains on target shares held by the bidder’s institutional investors 
more than offset their losses on bidder shares. To consider this possibility, for each target in our 
sample, we perform a shareholder-by-shareholder analysis. This test shows that monitoring 
institutions do not generally hold shares of the bidder firm, and in the few cases in which they 
do, they tend to have very small stakes. These results are consistent with the findings on cross-
holdings of Harford, Jenter and Li (2011), who show that in very few instances cross-holding 
institutions have large stakes in both the bidder and target. Given this, it is unlikely that cross-
holdings explain our results. Nonetheless, we rerun our target premium and acquirer return tests 
controlling for the presence of cross-holdings. Such control does not alter our results. 
 6.8. Banding rule affecting index reconstitutions 
  Chang, Hong and Liskovich (2013) note that, after 2007, Russell Inc. followed a more 
complicated rule to limit switching around the upper cut-off of the Russell 2000. Essentially, a 
stock could only change indices if it moved far enough beyond the 1000 cut-off. Under this rule 
known as “banding,” if two stocks (on the periphery of the threshold) are supposed to switch 
places in year t, Russell may leave them in their t-1 index if the market value differential is 
small.  
  Due to the banding rule, we repeat the tests presented in Table 7 excluding all deals that 
occur on or after 2007. All of our results continue to hold. The (untabulated) coefficients for the 
parameter estimates of the second stage premium regressions related to the change in the number 
of monitoring institutions, the change in the proportion of monitoring institutions, and the change 
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in the total ownership of monitoring institutions are 0.03 (p-value = 0.0001), 5.08 (p-value = 
0.0001) and 0.26 (p-value = 0.0001), respectively. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
  Several studies theorize that through activism, intervention and monitoring, large 
shareholders (such as institutional investors) can enhance the value of the firm (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998). Nonetheless, empirical evidence on the 
purported role of institutions in improving shareholder wealth is mixed. In a survey of the 
literature, Holderness (2003) asserts that with the exception of the form (and level) of executive 
compensation, few major corporate decisions have been shown to be different in the presence of 
blockholders. He notes that academic studies have not definitely established whether the impact 
of blockholders on firm value is positive or negative. We argue that the lack of academic 
consensus in assessing the impact of institutional ownership on shareholder wealth stems from 
the way the ownership is typically measured. Specifically, most studies track institutional 
ownership relative to a public firm’s outstanding common equity. The logic behind this measure 
is that the more equity the institution holds, the more likely it is that the firm will pay attention to 
this investor. This logic, however, ignores the possibility that even if the firm has to pay attention 
to an institution – because the latter holds an important block of the firm’s shares – the institution 
may not be interested in monitoring it. This could happen because, relative to the institution’s 
own portfolio, the firm may not be an important holding. 
  To investigate this issue, in this paper we propose a new way to proxy for the effect of 
institutional investors: we measure institutional ownership relative to the institution’s entire 
portfolio. We hypothesize that the more funds an institution invests in a given firm, the more 
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likely the institution is to monitor that firm. Based on this premise, we define monitoring 
institutions as those for which the firm constitutes a top ten portfolio holding.  
  We test our hypotheses in the context of acquisitions. This choice is motivated by the fact 
that acquisitions are notable investments in which the incentives of managers and investors are 
not always aligned.  
  Our results show that in M&A transactions monitoring institutions of the target firm are 
associated with (i) a higher probability of deal completion, (ii) a higher bid premium offered for 
the target firm, (iii) an increased likelihood that the bid for the target firm is revised upward, and 
(iv) a lower acquirer return. These findings support the view that institutional monitoring 
heightens when the target firm represents a top allocation of funds in the institution’s portfolio.  
By proposing a better measure of the relevant shareholdings for activist investors in a 
firm and by showing the net impact of such monitors on M&A deals, our study has broad 
implications for the literature studying the effect of institutional ownership on firm value. Our 
findings show that our monitoring institutions proxies better capture the influence and potential 
activism by institutional investors. We show that a firm is likely to listen to a monitoring 
institution even if this investor is not a blockholder. This could happen because, otherwise, the 
institution will try to coordinate with other investors (in order to have its voice heard) or will sell 
its stake. Both of these alternatives may attract unfavorable attention to the firm and its 
managers. 
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Table 1: M&A sample characteristics 
 
This table describes our sample which consists of 1,601 merger and acquisition bids by U.S. bidders for U.S. 
targets announced during 1984-2011 and tracked in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) merger and 
acquisition database. We screen deals from SDC following the criteria in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). In addition, we require that both acquirer and target firms have 
stock market, accounting, and institutional ownership data available from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), Compustat, and Thomson 13F, respectively. In Panel A we report the temporal and Fama and 
French 48 industrial distribution of the sample targets. In Panel B we report deal status, mode of acquisition, 
method of payment, deal attitude, deal value, and target financial characteristics. All financial variables are 
measured at the end of the fiscal year before the merger public announcement date and inflation-adjusted to the 
end of 2011.  
 
Panel A: Temporal and industrial distribution 
 
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Deal count 28 26 18 20 37 33 17 15 11 22 
Percent 1.75 1.62 1.12 1.25 2.31 2.06 1.06 0.94 0.69 1.37 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Deal count 45 56 71 77 89 158 123 120 68 82 
Percent 2.81 3.5 4.43 4.81 5.56 9.87 7.68 7.5 4.25 5.12 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Deal count 77 75 78 78 46 41 62 28 1,601 
Percent 4.81 4.68 4.87 4.87 2.87 2.56 3.87 1.75 100 
 
Industry Count %  Industry Count % 
Agriculture 1 0.06  Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 6 0.37 
Food Products 17 1.06  Defense 2 0.12 
Candy & Soda 2 0.12  Precious Metals 7 0.44 
Beer & Liquor 3 0.19  Industrial Metal Mining 2 0.12 
Tobacco Products 1 0.06  Petroleum and Natural Gas 56 3.50 
Recreation 12 0.75  Utilities 47 2.94 
Entertainment 21 1.31  Communication 45 2.81 
Printing and Publishing 5 0.31  Personal Services 3 0.19 
Consumer Goods 20 1.25  Business Services 195 12.18 
Apparel 8 0.50  Computer Hardware 94 5.87 
Healthcare 28 1.75  Computer Software 86 5.37 
Medical Equipment 70 4.37  Measuring and Control Equipment 46 2.87 
Pharmaceutical Products 71 4.43  Business Supplies 18 1.12 
Chemicals 17 1.06  Shipping Containers 5 0.31 
Rubber and Plastic Products 14 0.87  Transportation 28 1.75 
Textiles 5 0.31  Wholesale 28 1.75 
Construction Materials 21 1.31  Retail 65 4.06 
Construction 12 0.75  Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 12 0.75 
Steel work 14 0.87  Banking 349 21.80 
Fabricated Products 3 0.19  Insurance 36 2.25 
Machinery 37 2.31  Real Estate 8 0.50 
Electrical Equipment 4 0.25  Trading 52 3.25 
Automobiles and Trucks 11 0.69  Others 7 0.44 
Aircraft 7 0.44  Total 1,601 100 
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Panel B: Deal and firm characteristics     
 
 N Proportion of sample Mean Median 
Deal characteristics    
Completed 1,601 0.8339       (1,335)   
Tender offer 1,601 0.1805          (289)   
Stock only  1,601 0.3042          (487)   
Cash only  1,601 0.3348          (536)   
Friendly attitude 1,601 0.9113       (1,459)   
Same industry 1,601 0.6658       (1,066)   
Deal value (US$ billion) 1,601  1.4853 0.2342 
Relative size (Target/Acquirer) 1,601  0.3476 0.1188 
Target characteristics     
Market value of equity (US$ billion) 1,601  0.8321 0.1155 
Q 1,601  1.8331 1.2146 
Leverage 1,601  0.2139 0.1547 
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Table 2: Targets’ institutional monitoring proxies 
 
In this table we report summary statistics of the target firms’ institutional monitoring proxies. 
 
We report the 5 variables traditionally used in the literature to proxy for institutional monitoring. 
1. Number of blockholders: the number of institutions whose ownership in the target is at least 5% of the 
target’s shares outstanding 
2. Proportion of blockholders: the proportion of blockholders among all institutions holding the target’s 
shares 
3. Total ownership of blockholders: the total ownership of blockholders on the target’s total shares 
outstanding 
4. Total ownership of the five largest institutions: the total share ownership controlled by the five largest 
institutional investors in the target 
5. Ownership of the largest institution: the share ownership controlled by the largest institutional investor 
in the target 
 
We assume that institutions allocate their effort to a portfolio firm (here the target firm) based on the relative 
importance of their holding of the target’s stock in the portfolio. We define monitoring institutions as those 
whose holding value in the target is in the top 10% of their portfolio. We use 3 proxies of the target’s 
institutional monitoring: 
1. Number of monitoring institutions: the number of institutions whose holding value in the target is in 
the top 10% of the institution’s portfolio 
2. Proportion of monitoring institutions: the proportion of monitoring institutions among all institutions 
holding the target’s shares 
3. Total ownership of monitoring institutions: the total ownership of monitoring institutions as a 
proportion of the target’s total shares outstanding 
 
In Panel A, we report summary statistics for each institutional monitoring proxy for 1,601 sample targets and 
portfolio characteristics for 4,155 institutions holding shares in these targets during the last quarter end before 
the merger public announcement. In Panel B, we report the sample mean for each institutional monitoring 
proxy each year during 1984-2011.  
 
Panel A: Institutional ownership characteristics Mean Median Q1 Q3 σ 
Targets’ institutional blockholder measures: Traditional   
Number of institutional blockholders 1.4553 1.0000 0.0000 2.0000 1.4281 
Proportion of institutional blockholders 0.0545 0.0196 0.0000 0.0645 0.0939 
Total ownership of institutional blockholders 0.1266 0.0916 0.0000 0.1995 0.1328 
Total ownership of the five largest institutions 0.2051 0.1971 0.1087 0.2880 0.1278 
Ownership of the largest institution 0.0804 0.0719 0.0418 0.1024 0.0624 
Target’s institutional monitoring proxies: New   
Number of monitoring institutions 4.1224 0.0000 0.0000 2.0000 15.7879 
Proportion of monitoring institutions 0.0243 0.0000 0.0000 0.0370 0.0418 
Total ownership of monitoring institutions 0.0683 0.0000 0.0000 0.0913 0.1221 
Conditional on at least one monitoring institution   
Number of monitoring institutions 9.4828 3.0000 1.0000 8.0000 22.8675 
Proportion of monitoring institutions 0.0559 0.0424 0.0256 0.0696 0.0475 
Total ownership of monitoring institutions 0.1572 0.1086 0.0534 0.2069 0.1426 
Institutions’ portfolio holdings    
Number of monitored portfolio companies 24.4080 10.8000 5.6000 24.5000 39.9456 
Proportion of monitored portfolio market value 0.4280 0.4018 0.2960 0.5442 0.1788 
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Panel B: Mean institutional ownership by year 
   Traditional institutional blockholder measures  New institutional monitoring proxies 
Year 
Deal 
count 
Targets with 
institutional 
blockholders 
Number of  
institutional  
blockholders 
Proportion of 
institutional 
blockholders 
Total ownership 
of institutional 
blockholders 
Total ownership 
of the five largest 
institutions 
Ownership of 
the largest 
institution 
Targets with 
monitoring  
institutions 
Number of  
monitoring  
institutions 
Proportion of 
monitoring 
institutions 
Total ownership 
of monitoring 
institutions 
1984 28 12 2 0.0732 0.0538 0.1224 0.0534 9 5 0.0245 0.0238 
1985 26 11 1 0.0666 0.0412 0.1188 0.0489 12 6 0.0369 0.0494 
1986 18 13 2 0.1387 0.1219 0.1860 0.0813 8 1 0.0309 0.0399 
1987 20 10 2 0.0537 0.0681 0.1687 0.0610 11 3 0.0380 0.0626 
1988 37 20 2 0.0947 0.0867 0.1618 0.0741 12 2 0.0184 0.0388 
1989 33 14 1 0.0543 0.0541 0.1349 0.0620 8 10 0.0205 0.0465 
1990 17 10 1 0.0277 0.0543 0.1411 0.0539 6 5 0.0177 0.0226 
1991 15 8 1 0.0348 0.0579 0.1222 0.0512 4 6 0.0136 0.0397 
1992 11 6 2 0.0303 0.0928 0.1655 0.0749 4 6 0.0177 0.0384 
1993 22 13 1 0.0879 0.0887 0.1737 0.0812 9 3 0.0246 0.0513 
1994 45 24 2 0.0526 0.0827 0.1622 0.0610 10 7 0.0146 0.0405 
1995 56 40 2 0.0912 0.1208 0.2041 0.0865 21 4 0.0233 0.0631 
1996 71 50 2 0.0717 0.1373 0.2191 0.0840 26 6 0.0211 0.0652 
1997 77 49 2 0.0459 0.1171 0.1961 0.0772 37 8 0.0310 0.0820 
1998 89 58 2 0.0702 0.1276 0.1965 0.0772 31 10 0.0234 0.0687 
1999 158 106 2 0.0485 0.1178 0.1967 0.0745 80 10 0.0308 0.0803 
2000 123 83 2 0.0467 0.1127 0.1877 0.0765 49 9 0.0225 0.0554 
2001 120 69 2 0.0478 0.1130 0.1838 0.0792 38 9 0.0160 0.0538 
2002 68 46 2 0.0684 0.1413 0.2134 0.0986 21 13 0.0156 0.0414 
2003 82 59 2 0.0649 0.1509 0.2224 0.0947 31 10 0.0184 0.0604 
2004 77 53 2 0.0367 0.1082 0.1927 0.0701 36 10 0.0218 0.0643 
2005 75 64 3 0.0508 0.1797 0.2541 0.0907 41 13 0.0308 0.1008 
2006 78 66 2 0.0370 0.1659 0.2609 0.0934 56 11 0.0339 0.1158 
2007 78 63 2 0.0336 0.1581 0.2444 0.0832 41 7 0.0233 0.0796 
2008 46 41 3 0.0666 0.2002 0.2756 0.1021 20 19 0.0330 0.1028 
2009 41 30 3 0.0465 0.1811 0.2602 0.0991 20 21 0.0271 0.0748 
2010 62 45 3 0.0297 0.1652 0.2526 0.0963 39 8 0.0245 0.0978 
2011 28 22 3 0.0336 0.1509 0.2397 0.0718 16 12 0.0249 0.0793 
All 1,601 1,085 2 0.0545 0.1266 0.2051 0.0804 696 9 0.0243 0.0683 
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Table 3: Targets’ institutional monitoring and deal completion 
 
The sample consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions announced during 1984-2011 described in Table 1. 
We estimate logit regressions of merger completion probability similar to those in Officer (2003). The 
dependent variable equals one if the proposed bid is completed. The main independent variable is the 
number of monitoring institutions in Model (2), the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target’s 
institutions in Model (3), and the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Model (4). All variables are 
defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable = Deal completion (0,1) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total institutional blockholder ownership -0.4636 -0.2963 -0.6639 -1.1742 
 (0.5278) (0.6891) (0.3704) (0.1265) 
Targets’ institutional monitoring proxies     
Number of monitoring institutions  0.0166**   
  (0.0416)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   8.8989***  
   (0.0013)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    3.6886*** 
    (0.0008) 
Deal and market characteristics     
Target termination fee (0,1) 1.8968*** 1.9286*** 1.9279*** 1.9301*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Lockup (0,1) -0.1004 -0.0680 -0.0631 -0.0967 
 (0.8653) (0.9091) (0.9179) (0.8741) 
Competed deal (0,1) -2.1000*** -2.1695*** -2.1769*** -2.1671*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Toehold (0,1) 0.2048 0.2000 0.2530 0.2356 
 (0.5807) (0.5910) (0.4978) (0.5285) 
Cash only payment (0,1) 0.0227 0.0289 0.0186 0.0339 
 (0.9212) (0.9001) (0.9358) (0.8836) 
Stock only payment (0,1) 0.3641* 0.3440 0.3209 0.3575* 
 (0.0912) (0.1118) (0.1393) (0.0994) 
Tender offer (0,1) 1.3372*** 1.4095*** 1.3996*** 1.4064*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Hostile deal (0,1) -2.1979*** -2.2558*** -2.2796*** -2.3088*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.6966 -0.7748 -0.7249 -0.7178 
 (0.3413) (0.2992) (0.3336) (0.3358) 
Same industry (0,1) 0.4486** 0.4559** 0.4764** 0.4788** 
 (0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0129) (0.0125) 
Relative size (Target / Acquirer) -0.2562** -0.2392** -0.2378** -0.2547** 
 (0.0329) (0.0465) (0.0473) (0.0364) 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2321* 0.2161* 0.2528* 0.2678* 
 (0.0559) (0.0587) (0.0527) (0.0504) 
Target’s size 0.0003 -0.0787 -0.1358* -0.1507** 
 (0.9959) (0.2330) (0.0552) (0.0370) 
Target industry liquidity index 0.2958 0.3243 0.3291 0.3177 
 (0.5230) (0.4870) (0.4828) (0.4987) 
One year macroeconomic change  0.0140 0.0097 0.0017 0.0149 
 (0.8315) (0.8831) (0.9789) (0.8208) 
Constant -0.1817 0.1197 0.4822 0.5472 
 (0.8656) (0.9123) (0.6618) (0.6210) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 4: Targets’ institutional monitoring and bid revision 
 
The sample consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions announced during 1984-2011 described in Table 1. 
We estimate logit regressions of bid revision probabilities similar to those in Bates, Lemmon, and Linck 
(2006). The dependent variable equals one if there is a revision of the bid price in Model (1), downward 
price revision in Model (2), and upward revision in Models (3)-(5). The main independent variable is the 
total ownership of monitoring institutions in Models (1)-(3), the number of monitoring institutions in 
Model (4), and the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target’s institutions in Model (5). All 
variables are defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent var = Bid revision (0,1) All Downward Upward  Upward  Upward  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Total inst blockholder ownership 0.6798 -0.1866 0.7269 1.4354 1.1152 
 (0.3917) (0.8921) (0.5371) (0.2229) (0.3412) 
Targets’ inst monitoring proxies      
Total ownership of monitor inst  1.9506** 1.0505 2.5167**   
 (0.0283) (0.5515) (0.0122)   
Number of monitoring inst     0.0170**  
    (0.0449)  
Proportion of monitoring inst     5.8901** 
     (0.0363) 
Deal and market characteristics      
Target termination fee (0,1) -0.1247 -0.0656 -0.0553 0.0059 -0.0324 
 (0.5899) (0.8638) (0.8466) (0.9837) (0.9094) 
Lockup (0,1) -1.2376 -5.7726 -0.8244 -0.5207 -0.6224 
 (0.2627) (0.8017) (0.4746) (0.6465) (0.5840) 
Competed deal (0,1) 1.3258*** -7.1130 2.1357*** 2.1587*** 2.1371*** 
 (0.0001) (0.5055) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Toehold (0,1) 0.5189 0.5456 0.4959 0.4488 0.4375 
 (0.1822) (0.3407) (0.2960) (0.3471) (0.3566) 
Cash only payment (0,1) -0.1466 -0.2155 -0.1174 -0.1209 -0.1401 
 (0.5864) (0.6317) (0.7215) (0.7143) (0.6703) 
Stock only payment (0,1) 0.2103 -0.3209 0.5141 0.5338 0.4778 
 (0.4181) (0.4222) (0.1200) (0.1077) (0.1477) 
Tender offer (0,1) 0.1484 -0.5236 0.4726 0.5000 0.4950 
 (0.6141) (0.3439) (0.1695) (0.1465) (0.1506) 
Hostile deal (0,1) 3.7279*** 2.0350*** 4.0183*** 4.1349*** 4.0746*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.3710 -5.4035 -0.1635 -0.3561 -0.1538 
 (0.7396) (0.8617) (0.8891) (0.7655) (0.8954) 
Same industry (0,1) 0.4435* 0.0548 0.5020* 0.4738 0.4834 
 (0.0592) (0.8806) (0.0883) (0.1072) (0.1004) 
Relative size (Target / Acquirer) 0.0212 0.1126 -0.2017 -0.1761 -0.1752 
 (0.6657) (0.1818) (0.4051) (0.4288) (0.4356) 
Target’s size 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.1199) (0.3358) (0.4362) (0.3547) (0.5110) 
Target industry liquidity index 0.0473 -1.3563 0.5734 0.6019 0.6192 
 (0.9242) (0.1358) (0.3380) (0.3120) (0.2984) 
One year macroeconomic change  0.0947 0.3410** 0.0123 0.0121 0.0107 
 (0.1938) (0.0213) (0.8931) (0.8947) (0.9061) 
ln (Initial offer premium)  -0.1404 -0.1228 -0.1355 -0.1581 -0.1463 
 (0.2256) (0.5162) (0.3431) (0.2620) (0.3026) 
Constant -10.9710 -9.6006 -11.3341 -10.9236 -11.0186 
 (0.9562) (0.9634) (0.9568) (0.9589) (0.9577) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 5: Targets’ institutional monitoring and acquisition premiums 
  
Panel A presents first stage regressions of the probability of becoming a takeover target using 154,227 
firm-years with data from CRSP and Compustat during fiscal year 1983-2011. These tests are similar to 
those in Palepu (1986). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel B we estimate OLS 
regressions of merger premiums similar to those in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008). The 
dependent variable is the final offer premium reported by SDC. The main independent variable is the 
number of monitoring institutions in Model (2), the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target’s 
institutions in Model (3), and the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Model (4). The sample 
consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions described in Table 1. We include the inverse Mill’s ratio 
obtained from the first stage test to control for target self-selection (Heckman, 1979). All variables are 
defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Probability of becoming a target 
 Dependent variable = Target (0,1) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total institutional blockholder ownership -0.1893 -0.2368 -0.1734 -0.0963 
 (0.2004) (0.1113) (0.2414) (0.5284) 
Number of monitoring institutions  -0.0032**   
  (0.0198)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   -1.1854**  
   (0.0225)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    -0.5595** 
    (0.0123) 
Size -0.3545*** -0.4021*** -0.3979*** -0.4013*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Q 0.0313* 0.0186 0.0257* 0.0244 
 (0.0507) (0.1322) (0.0962) (0.1130) 
Leverage -0.0022 0.0127 0.0160 0.0202 
 (0.8523) (0.3320) (0.2535) (0.1647) 
Liquidity 0.0630*** 0.0559** 0.0563** 0.0538*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0153) (0.0139) (0.0199) 
OCF -0.0628 -0.0363 -0.1027* -0.1097* 
 (0.2902) (0.1363) (0.0920) (0.0733) 
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0064 -0.0062 
 (0.1378) (0.1410) (0.1464) (0.1643) 
Target Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.5589 0.5849 0.5805 0.6154 
 (0.3408) (0.3194) (0.3228) (0.2953) 
Target industry liquidity index 0.3445 0.3532 0.3467 0.3386 
 (0.1816) (0.1707) (0.1785) (0.1890) 
One year macroeconomic change  0.0109 0.0112 0.0110 0.0108 
 (0.5278) (0.5165) (0.5226) (0.5301) 
Constant -78.8002 -46.5774 -127.1627* -136.8273 
 (0.2722) (0.1116) (0.0855) (0.1566) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 154,227 154,227 154,227 154,227 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Panel B: Targets’ institutional monitoring and acquisition premiums 
 Dependent variable = Acquisition premium 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total institutional blockholder ownership 0.0463 0.0592 0.0251 0.0067 
 (0.5308) (0.4230) (0.7336) (0.9313) 
Targets’ institutional monitoring proxies     
Number of monitoring institutions  0.0016**   
  (0.0193)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   0.9722***  
   (0.0007)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    0.2388** 
    (0.0234) 
Target characteristics     
Size -0.0366*** -0.0448*** -0.0517*** -0.0474*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.9468) (0.9933) (0.9280) (0.9698) 
Leverage -0.0813 -0.0775 -0.0724 -0.0771 
 (0.2113) (0.2334) (0.2647) (0.2358) 
Liquidity 0.0742* 0.0859** 0.0873*** 0.0866*** 
 (0.0688) (0.0124) (0.0055) (0.0098) 
OCF -0.0321 -0.0302 -0.0308 -0.0313 
 (0.5711) (0.5927) (0.5847) (0.5803) 
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0623*** -0.0630*** -0.0730*** -0.0672*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Acquirer characteristics     
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.9396) (0.8786) (0.7560) (0.8385) 
Leverage 0.0549 0.0619 0.0640 0.0639 
 (0.4723) (0.4176) (0.4013) (0.4029) 
Liquidity 0.0133 0.0182 0.0175 0.0173 
 (0.5497) (0.4152) (0.4312) (0.4380) 
OCF 0.0255 0.0204 0.0197 0.0234 
 (0.6618) (0.7260) (0.7348) (0.6880) 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0208 0.0202 0.0179 0.0190 
 (0.1793) (0.1904) (0.2463) (0.2191) 
Deal and market characteristics     
Relative size (Target / Acquirer) -0.0170** -0.0164** -0.0158** -0.0162** 
 (0.0204) (0.0253) (0.0306) (0.0268) 
Cash only payment (0,1) 0.0518** 0.0534** 0.0534** 0.0536** 
 (0.0335) (0.0279) (0.0276) (0.0276) 
Stock only payment (0,1) 0.0229 0.0237 0.0227 0.0252 
 (0.3360) (0.3185) (0.3372) (0.2882) 
Tender offer (0,1) 0.0843*** 0.0878*** 0.0878*** 0.0877*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Hostile deal (0,1) 0.0490 0.0483 0.0444 0.0436 
 (0.2871) (0.2932) (0.3328) (0.3431) 
Competed deal (0,1) 0.1319*** 0.1282*** 0.1278*** 0.1308*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Toehold (0,1) -0.0372 -0.0357 -0.0348 -0.0364 
 (0.3829) (0.4024) (0.4127) (0.3935) 
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.0425* 0.0479** 0.0464** 0.0448** 
 (0.0584) (0.0333) (0.0381) (0.0458) 
Lockup (0,1) -0.0289 -0.0259 -0.0335 -0.0332 
 (0.6939) (0.7239) (0.6469) (0.6503) 
Same industry (0,1) 0.0188 0.0199 0.0188 0.0203 
 (0.3566) (0.3278) (0.3562) (0.3194) 
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Merger of equals (0,1) -0.2047** -0.2154** -0.2098** -0.2084** 
 (0.0264) (0.0194) (0.0224) (0.0236) 
Target Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.4174 -0.4534 -0.4461 -0.4604 
 (0.2607) (0.2216) (0.2279) (0.2148) 
Target industry liquidity index 0.0485 0.0533 0.0521 0.0496 
 (0.3348) (0.2890) (0.2992) (0.3234) 
One year macroeconomic change  -0.0247*** -0.0248*** -0.0255*** -0.0248*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.5648*** 0.5847*** 0.6233*** 0.6093*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Heckman self-selectivity correction Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 6: Targets’ institutional monitoring and unconditional premiums 
  
This table presents unconditional premium regressions similar to those in Comment and Schwert (1995). 
The dependent variable is the acquisition premium reported by SDC. The premium is set to zero in non-
takeover firm-years. All models use 154,227 firm-years with data available from CRSP and Compustat 
during fiscal year 1983-2011. The main independent variable is the number of monitoring institutions in 
Model (2), the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target’s institutions in Model (3), and the 
total ownership of monitoring institutions in Model (4). All variables are defined in the appendix. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable = Acquisition premium 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total institutional blockholder ownership 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.9254) (0.9245) (0.9247) (0.8997) 
Targets’ institutional monitoring proxies     
Number of monitoring institutions  0.0000   
  (0.8570)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   -0.0014  
   (0.9297)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    -0.0006 
    (0.8501) 
Size -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0008* -0.0008* 
 (0.0362) (0.0468) (0.0844) (0.0531) 
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.9186) (0.9186) (0.9182) (0.9187) 
Leverage 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Liquidity 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.6216) (0.6436) (0.6164) (0.6148) 
OCF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.9918) (0.9911) (0.9921) (0.9921) 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.6877) (0.6889) (0.6879) (0.6887) 
Target Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0121 -0.0122 
 (0.5246) (0.5201) (0.5283) (0.5266) 
Target industry liquidity index -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0064 
 (0.5101) (0.5107) (0.5100) (0.5099) 
One year macroeconomic change  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.6643) (0.6619) (0.6646) (0.6671) 
Constant -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0015 
 (0.7296) (0.7580) (0.7214) (0.7145) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 154,227 154,227 154,227 154,227 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 7: Endogeneity of institutional monitoring and acquisition premiums 
  
This table addresses the endogeneity of institutional monitoring and the acquisition premiums using a regression discontinuity approach around index reconstitutions. 
The specification is similar to that in Schmidt (2013). Model (1) presents the first stage regression of the change in the number of monitoring institutions on target 
characteristics and Russell index inclusions using 154,227 firm-years with data from CRSP and Compustat during fiscal year 1983-2011. Model (2) presents the 
second stage regression of the acquisition premium on the predicted change in the number of monitoring institutions obtained from the first stage. Model (3) presents 
the regular regression of the acquisition premium on the change in the number of monitoring institutions. We use the proportion of monitoring institutions among all 
target’s institutions in Models (4) and (5), and the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Models (6) and (7). In Models (2) to (7), the sample consists of 1,601 
mergers and acquisitions described in Table 1. All variables are defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Number of  
              monitoring institutions            . 
Proportion of  
monitoring institutions 
Ownership of  
monitoring institutions 
Dependent variable = 
Change in number 
of monitoring inst.
Premium Premium Premium Premium Premium Premium 
 1
st
 stage 2
nd
 stage IV OLS 2
nd
 stage IV OLS 2
nd
 stage IV OLS 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Change in number of monitoring inst ( t-1 , t )  0.0317*** 0.0003     
  (0.0001) (0.9226)     
Change in proportion of monitoring inst ( t-1 , t )    5.5829*** -0.6978   
    (0.0001) (0.2006)   
Change in total ownership of monitoring inst ( t-1 , t )      0.2866*** -0.2035 
      (0.0001) (0.2220) 
Russell index inclusion of target        
Russell 1000 t-1  Russell 2000 t -1.0309***       
 (0.0001)       
Russell 2000 t-1  No index t -0.1641*       
 (0.0918)       
Russell 2000 t-1  Russell 1000 t 0.2261       
 (0.2863)       
No index t-1  Russell 2000 t -0.2435*       
 (0.0975)       
Change in ranking in Russell ( t-1 , t ) 0.0000       
 (0.2031)       
[ Change in ranking in Russell ( t-1 , t )  ]
2
 0.0000       
 (0.2602)       
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Target characteristics        
Total institutional blockholder ownership -0.0001 0.0631 0.0687 0.0664 0.0704 0.0651 0.0743 
 (0.9876) (0.3752) (0.5613) (0.3549) (0.5507) (0.3616) (0.5295) 
Size 0.5587*** -0.0244*** -0.0187* -0.0237*** -0.0189* -0.0245*** -0.0185* 
 (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0840) (0.0010) (0.0885) (0.0006) (0.0871) 
Q 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.4090) (0.7951) (0.9206) (0.8069) (0.9058) (0.8328) (0.9308) 
Leverage -2.2110*** -0.1036* -0.0632 -0.1053* -0.0730 -0.1017* -0.0677 
 (0.0001) (0.0798) (0.5100) (0.0776) (0.4460) (0.0865) (0.4795) 
Liquidity -0.3403*** 0.0552*** 0.0617*** 0.0560*** 0.0616*** 0.0556*** 0.0618*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0095) (0.0001) (0.0094) (0.0001) (0.0092) 
OCF 0.0003 -0.0579 -0.1847** -0.0563 -0.1845** -0.0549 -0.1849** 
 (0.7466) (0.2389) (0.0263) (0.2570) (0.0262) (0.2652) (0.0260) 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0104** -0.0707*** -0.0508* -0.0695*** -0.0492* -0.0703*** -0.0527* 
 (0.0142) (0.0001) (0.0700) (0.0001) (0.0784) (0.0001) (0.0601) 
Acquirer characteristics        
Q  0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.7257) (0.9198) (0.7570) (0.9665) (0.7289) (0.9322) 
Leverage  0.0418 -0.0561 0.0407 -0.0576 0.0361 -0.0594 
  (0.5700) (0.6531) (0.5836) (0.6431) (0.6240) (0.6335) 
Liquidity  0.0275 0.0301 0.0290 0.0286 0.0289 0.0280 
  (0.2054) (0.4479) (0.1857) (0.4677) (0.1834) (0.4781) 
OCF  0.0700 0.0095 0.0638 0.0211 0.0656 0.0193 
  (0.2123) (0.9233) (0.2598) (0.8306) (0.2433) (0.8450) 
Prior year market adjusted return  0.0191 0.0187 0.0169 0.0167 0.0174 0.0184 
  (0.2010) (0.4481) (0.2623) (0.4965) (0.2437) (0.4524) 
Deal and market characteristics        
Relative size (Target / Acquirer)  -0.0183** -0.0175** -0.0189*** -0.0165* -0.0186** -0.0170** 
  (0.0110) (0.0307) (0.0069) (0.0747) (0.0101) (0.0472) 
Cash only payment (0,1)  0.0397** 0.0406** 0.0342** 0.0392** 0.0399** 0.0389** 
  (0.0304) (0.0311) (0.0391) (0.0427) (0.0300) (0.0482) 
Stock only payment (0,1)  0.0202 0.0019 0.0223 0.0031 0.0191 0.0023 
  (0.3765) (0.9595) (0.3348) (0.9345) (0.4051) (0.9513) 
Tender offer (0,1)  0.0922*** 0.0997** 0.0935*** 0.1015** 0.0917*** 0.1007** 
  (0.0005) (0.0302) (0.0005) (0.0271) (0.0006) (0.0285) 
Hostile deal (0,1)  0.0428 0.1235 0.0433 0.1422 0.0432 0.1271 
  (0.3280) (0.1575) (0.3266) (0.1060) (0.3252) (0.1457) 
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Competed deal (0,1)  0.1272*** 0.1566** 0.1256*** 0.1516** 0.1254*** 0.1561** 
  (0.0002) (0.0162) (0.0002) (0.0199) (0.0002) (0.0165) 
Toehold (0,1)  -0.0208 -0.0435 -0.0252 -0.0427 -0.0218 -0.0425 
  (0.6129) (0.6341) (0.5443) (0.6397) (0.5970) (0.6421) 
Target termination fee (0,1)  0.0405* 0.0662* 0.0423* 0.0676** 0.0408* 0.0669* 
  (0.0585) (0.0548) (0.0501) (0.0493) (0.0569) (0.0519) 
Lockup (0,1)  -0.0448 0.0441 -0.0489 0.0615 -0.0483 0.0478 
  (0.5268) (0.8043) (0.4932) (0.7296) (0.4958) (0.7880) 
Same industry (0,1)  0.0150 0.0155 0.0159 0.0177 0.0137 0.0165 
  (0.4458) (0.6363) (0.4231) (0.5878) (0.4870) (0.6142) 
Merger of equals (0,1)  -0.1909** -0.2479* -0.1970** -0.2561* -0.1953** -0.2542* 
  (0.0315) (0.0729) (0.0279) (0.0634) (0.0282) (0.0657) 
Target Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 2.7874*** -0.5779 -0.6516 -0.5645 -0.6415 -0.5581 -0.6422 
 (0.0002) (0.1070) (0.3884) (0.1187) (0.3942) (0.1204) (0.3941) 
Target industry liquidity index 0.2912 0.0339 0.0901 0.0416 0.0938 0.0385 0.0942 
 (0.4168) (0.4843) (0.2688) (0.3959) (0.2486) (0.4287) (0.2474) 
One year macroeconomic change  0.0796*** -0.0247*** -0.0307*** -0.0240*** -0.0312*** -0.0237*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0065) (0.0004) (0.0056) (0.0005) (0.0054) 
Constant -2.1904*** 0.3800*** 0.4365** 0.3691*** 0.4279** 0.3803*** 0.4278** 
 (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0307) (0.0016) (0.0332) (0.0010) (0.0335) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 154,227 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 8: Targets’ institutional monitoring, acquirer returns and division of merger gains 
 
The sample consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions announced during 1984-2011 described in Table 1. 
In Panel A, we estimate OLS regressions of acquirer announcement returns similar to those in Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). The dependent variable is the 
acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over three days around the merger announcement date. In 
Panel B, we estimate OLS regressions of the relative gains of the target vs the acquirer per dollar of total 
market value similar to those in Ahern (2012). In both panels, the main independent variable is the number 
of monitoring institutions in Model (2), the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target’s 
institutions in Model (3), and the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Model (4). All variables are 
defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Acquirer returns 
 Dependent variable = Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total institutional blockholder ownership -0.0023 -0.0033 0.0025 0.0111 
 (0.8689) (0.8074) (0.8563) (0.4374) 
Targets’ institutional monitoring proxies     
Number of monitoring institutions  -0.0004***   
  (0.0015)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   -0.1330***  
   (0.0031)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    -0.0504*** 
    (0.0019) 
Acquirer characteristics     
Size 0.0000 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 
 (0.9905) (0.3786) (0.3644) (0.3303) 
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.6375) (0.6755) (0.7072) (0.6873) 
Leverage -0.0002 0.0003 0.0008 0.0001 
 (0.9863) (0.9792) (0.9411) (0.9950) 
Liquidity -0.0089** -0.0099** -0.0095** -0.0097** 
 (0.0425) (0.0238) (0.0300) (0.0277) 
OCF -0.0055 -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0045 
 (0.6117) (0.7085) (0.6936) (0.6762) 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0126*** 0.0127*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Target characteristics     
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.4887) (0.5962) (0.6783) (0.6074) 
Leverage -0.0053 -0.0066 -0.0070 -0.0065 
 (0.4968) (0.3946) (0.3691) (0.4053) 
Liquidity -0.0040* -0.0039* -0.0032 -0.0033 
 (0.0794) (0.0873) (0.1612) (0.1537) 
OCF -0.0002 0.0015 0.0017 0.0020 
 (0.9811) (0.8725) (0.8605) (0.8337) 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0019 0.0019 0.0025 0.0023 
 (0.3777) (0.3576) (0.2436) (0.2755) 
Deal and market characteristics     
Relative size (Target / Acquirer) -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.7970) (0.9743) (0.9653) (0.9939) 
Cash only payment (0,1) 0.0240*** 0.0222*** 0.0223*** 0.0220*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Stock only payment (0,1) -0.0052 -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0058 
 (0.2344) (0.2128) (0.2335) (0.1866) 
Tender offer (0,1) 0.0088* 0.0082 0.0084 0.0082 
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 (0.0886) (0.1108) (0.1007) (0.1080) 
Hostile deal (0,1) -0.0118 -0.0096 -0.0094 -0.0086 
 (0.1619) (0.2522) (0.2665) (0.3076) 
Competed deal (0,1) -0.0052 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0038 
 (0.4220) (0.6099) (0.5796) (0.5561) 
Toehold (0,1) 0.0012 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 
 (0.8787) (0.9166) (0.9498) (0.9360) 
Merger of equals (0,1) 0.0256 0.0299* 0.0284* 0.0288* 
 (0.1285) (0.0762) (0.0912) (0.0872) 
Same industry (0,1) 0.0030 0.0031 0.0035 0.0031 
 (0.5069) (0.4934) (0.4390) (0.4935) 
Competitive industry (0,1) 0.0052 0.0051 0.0052 0.0051 
 (0.2392) (0.2436) (0.2309) (0.2419) 
Unique industry (0,1) 0.0077 0.0080 0.0076 0.0074 
 (0.1219) (0.1084) (0.1280) (0.1359) 
High tech industry (0,1) -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0092 -0.0089 
 (0.2148) (0.2191) (0.1875) (0.2045) 
Target industry liquidity index -0.0178* -0.0187** -0.0184** -0.0182* 
 (0.0569) (0.0449) (0.0488) (0.0520) 
One year macroeconomic change  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.9207) (0.9139) (0.8752) (0.9369) 
Constant -0.0073 -0.0104 -0.0118 -0.0122 
 (0.7340) (0.6283) (0.5822) (0.5692) 
Heckman self-selectivity correction Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
 
Panel B: Division of merger gains 
 
Dependent variable = Relative gain of the target vs the 
acquirer per dollar of total market value 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total institutional blockholder ownership 0.0037 0.0039 0.0027 0.0013 
 (0.3575) (0.2039) (0.3767) (0.3377) 
Targets’ institutional monitoring proxies     
Number of monitoring institutions  0.0006***   
  (0.0001)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   0.2678***  
   (0.0001)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    0.0892*** 
    (0.0001) 
     
Other controls as in Panel A Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regression’s  p-value  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 9: Robustness  
 
Panel A presents regressions of acquisition premiums on the residual of the target’s institutional 
monitoring proxies. These residuals are retained from three (untabulated) first step regressions that use the 
number of monitoring institutions, the proportion of monitoring institutions, and the total ownership of 
monitoring institutions as the respective dependent variables. Models (1), (2), and (3) show the premium 
regressions where the first step tests use target’s size, lagged stock return, leverage, Q, G-index, board size, 
board ownership, independent board (0,1), busy board (0,1), and Delaware (0,1) as independent variables. 
In Panel A, the sample size is reduced due to governance and director data availability from RiskMetrics. 
Panels B and D present OLS regressions of acquirer announcement returns similar to those in Table 8. 
Panel C reports four premium regressions similar to those in Panel B of Table 5. The subsample analyzed 
in Panels C and D consists of 1,156 deals from the original sample of 1,601 deals described in Table 1. 
This subsample excludes target firms operating in the Financial industry (i.e., Banking, Insurance, Real 
Estate and Trading). All variables are defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Controlling for governance - Abnormal institutional monitoring and acquisition premiums 
 Dependent variable = Acquisition premium 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Number of monitoring inst residual 0.0015*   
 (0.0603)   
Proportion of monitoring inst residual  1.4683***  
  (0.0060)  
Ownership of monitoring inst residual   0.3714** 
   (0.0369) 
Other controls as in Table 5 Panel B Yes Yes Yes 
N 389 389 389 
 
Panel B: Different CAR windows - Targets’ institutional monitoring and acquirer returns 
 
Dependent variable = Acquirer return alternatives 
Model (1) 
CAR [-2,+2] 
Model (2)  
CAR [-5,+5] 
Institutional blockholder ownership 0.0026 -0.0093 
 (0.8856) (0.6782) 
Total ownership of monitoring institutions -0.0629*** -0.0522** 
 (0.0022) (0.0396) 
 
Panel C: Excluding financial firms - Targets’ institutional monitoring and acquisition premiums 
 Dependent variable = Acquisition premium 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Institutional blockholder ownership 0.0745 0.0918 0.0573 0.0257 
 (0.4275) (0.3298) (0.5405) (0.7909) 
Number of monitoring institutions  0.0016*   
  (0.0511)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   1.2236***  
   (0.0012)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    0.2551** 
    (0.0492) 
 
Panel D: Excluding financial firms - Targets’ institutional monitoring and acquirer returns 
 Dependent variable = Acquirer return  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Institutional blockholder ownership 0.0047 -0.0022 0.0084 0.0173 
 (0.7859) (0.8972) (0.6287) (0.3299) 
Number of monitoring institutions  -0.0003***   
  (0.0052)   
Proportion of monitoring institutions   -0.1532***  
   (0.0076)  
Total ownership of monitoring institutions    -0.0561*** 
    (0.0043) 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Institutional monitoring proxies  
Number of monitoring institutions the number of institutions whose holding value in the target is in the 
top 10% of their portfolio 
Proportion of monitoring 
institutions 
the proportion of monitoring institutions among all institutions 
holding the target’s shares 
Total ownership of monitoring 
institutions 
the total ownership of monitoring institutions on the target’s total 
shares outstanding 
Traditional blockholder proxies  
Number of blockholders the number of institutions whose ownership in the target is at least 
5% of the target’s shares outstanding 
Proportion of blockholders the proportion of blockholders among all institutions holding the 
target’s shares 
Total ownership of blockholders the total ownership of blockholders on the target’s total shares 
outstanding 
Total ownership of the five largest 
institutions 
the total share ownership controlled by the five largest institutional 
investors in the target 
Ownership of the largest   
institution 
the share ownership controlled by the largest institutional investor in 
the target 
Deal characteristics  
Acquisition premium the offer price divided by the target’s stock price four weeks before 
the merger announcement date, as reported by SDC and limited 
between 0% and 200% 
Combined premium Following Officer (2003), we first estimate a premium based on 
“component” data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and 
other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as 
reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on “initial 
price” and “final price” data, respectively. These prices are also 
reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by 
the target’s market value 42 trading days prior to the bid 
announcement. The combined premium is based on the 
component measure if it is greater than 0% and less than 200%; 
otherwise the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on 
the final price measure if initial price data are missing). 
Target CAR  the target’s cumulative abnormal return over the window around the 
merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from the 
market model estimated during the one year window ending 
four weeks prior to the merger announcement 
Acquirer CAR  the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return over the window around 
the merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from 
the market model estimated during the one year window ending 
four weeks prior to the merger announcement 
Division of merger gains 
(Target/Acquirer) 
the target’s gain relative to the acquirer’s gain defined as target 
$CAR minus acquirer $CAR divided by the sum of acquirer and 
target market values 50 trading days before the merger 
announcement as in Ahern (2012). This division of merger 
gains measure represents the relative gain of the target versus 
the acquirer for each dollar of total market value, without the 
concern that total gains may be negative. 
Completion (0,1) one if the announced deal is completed 
Target termination fee (0,1) one if the target has a termination fee provision in the merger 
contract 
Lockup (0,1) one if the deal includes a lockup of target or acquirer shares 
Prior bidding (0,1) one if the deal follows a prior bid within one year 
Toehold (0,1) one if the bidder owns a fraction of the target’s shares 
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Cash only payment (0,1) one if the deal is paid entirely in cash 
Stock only payment (0,1) one if the deal is paid entirely in stock 
Tender offer (0,1) one if the form of the deal is a tender offer 
Merger of equals (0,1) one if the deal is classified by SDC as a merger of equals 
Same industry (0,1) one if both the target and the acquirer belong to the same Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industrial classification group 
Market characteristics  
Target Herfindahl-Hirschman index the competitiveness of the target industry. An industry’s Herfindahl 
index is computed as the sum of squared market shares of all 
firms in the industry using data on sales, as in Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2007). 
Target industry liquidity the liquidity of the market for corporate control for the target firms’ 
industry. This variable is defined as the value of all corporate 
control transactions for US$1 million or more reported by SDC 
for each year and industry divided by the total book value of 
assets of all Compustat firms in the same industry and year, as 
in Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2002) 
One year macroeconomic change the difference in the industrial production index over one year 
period before the merger 
Competitive industry (0,1) one if the bidder’s industry is in the bottom quartile of all industries 
sorted annually by the Herfindahl index. An industry’s 
Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of squared market 
shares of all firms in the industry using data on sales (as in 
Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007) 
Unique industry (0,1) one if the bidder’s industry is in the top quartile of all industries 
sorted annually by industry-median product uniqueness. Product 
uniqueness is defined as selling expenses scaled by sales (as in 
Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007) 
High tech industry (0,1) one if bidder and target are both from high tech industries defined 
by Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
Financial characteristics  
Size the natural logarithm of the market value of assets  
Q the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets 
Leverage the book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and 
market value of equity. 
Liquidity the natural logarithm of one plus the average of the daily Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure over the fiscal year, multiplied by 
minus one to facilitate the liquidity interpretation since a lower 
Amihud’s value implies a higher liquidity level. 
Operating cash flow the cash flow from operations scaled by the value of assets  
Prior year market adjusted return the cumulative abnormal return during the one year window ending 
four weeks prior to the merger announcement, calculated as the 
residual from the market model estimated during the year before 
Governance characteristics  
G index  the sum of 24 antitakeover provisions tracked by RiskMetrics as in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
Board size the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
Board ownership  the equity owned by all directors (excluding the CEO) as a 
proportion of the firm’s shares outstanding 
Independent board (0,1) one if at least half of the board’s directors are independent. A 
director is considered independent if s/he is not a current or 
former employee of the firm or a subsidiary, and is not affiliated 
with the company as defined by RiskMetrics. 
Busy board (0,1)  one if at least 50% of outside directors hold three or more 
directorships 
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Delaware (0,1)  one if the company is incorporated in the state of Delaware 
Russell index inclusion of target  
Russell 1000 t-1  Russell 2000 t one if the target firm moves from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 
2000  
Russell 2000 t-1  No index t one if the target firm moves out of the Russell 2000 to below the top 
3000 
Russell 2000 t-1  Russell 1000 t one if the target firm moves from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 
1000 
No index t-1  Russell 2000 t one if the target firm moves to the Russell 2000 from below the top 
3000  
Change in ranking in Russell ( t-1 , t ) change in the target firm’s ranking in the Russell from time t-1 to t 
Other variables  
Heckman self-selectivity the Heckman (1979) lambda obtained from a two stage estimation 
process. In the first-stage, we estimate the probability of 
becoming a target. In the second stage, the inverse Mill's ratio 
from the first stage model is included in the estimation as a 
variable to control for self-selection. 
  
 
